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And This Just In...
Marlene Fernandez
I
t has been said that all the 
media cares about is blood, 
money, sex, drugs and rock 
’n ’ roll. Not quite -  but not 
too far from the truth.
Media coverage is indeed cri- 
sis-oriented: death, destruction and 
disaster make a story. We cover 
change, not continuity; crisis, not 
steady improvement; individuals, 
not societal change. News is, “Man 
bites dog,” no t “Dog bites m an.”
In the case of U.S. coverage on 
Latin America, traditionally, a story 
is weighted, not according to the 
degree of real impact in the coun­
try, but to the degree of U.S. 
involvement in that particular story. 
Ever since the 1950s, when the com­
munist threat was well and alive, 
and Latin America was ground for 
ideological confrontation; ever 
since the CIA-supported military 
coup in Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, 
support for military regimes, and 
covert wars in Central America, the 
story was not what Latin America 
was experiencing, but the degree of 
wrongdoing, complicity, or viola­
tions of U.S. law.
Today, this trend continues, and 
added to the list are stories which 
play on American fears — drug traf­
ficking, low-paying maquiladoras that 
“steal” American jobs, illegal immi­
gration and attacks on U.S. citizens 
living in Latin America.
N othing illustrates this better 
than the recent Guatemala-CIA
Marlene Fernandez is bureau chief for 
CNN Spanish. This commentary is an 
excerpt of a speech to the Thirteenth 
Annual Journalists and Editors 
Workshop, April 20-21, 1995, held at 
The Miami Herald.
scandal. For months, Jennifer 
Harbury, the widow of an indige­
nous Guatemala guerrilla, went to 
extremes, resorting to hunger 
strikes, protests and rallies in an 
attem pt to attract the attention of 
the press into covering the disap­
pearance of her husband in 
Guatemala.
The story was reported, bu t did 
not make front page until 
Congressman Robert Torricelli of 
the House Intelligence Committee 
released inform ation which linked 
the CIA to the scandal. It was 
the possibility of wrongdoing by 
the intelligence agency which 
made it a big story to the U.S. 
media.
Just before coming to Miami, I 
asked CNN’s anchor Reid Collins 
how he viewed U.S. m edia coverage 
of Latin America in 1995. His 
response was revealing.
“It would be nice to see more 
noncrisis news of the region to 
relieve the impression that Latin 
America careens from one catastro­
phe to another,” said Collins. “As 
we know,” he continued, “this is not 
in the cards so long as the viewers’ 
appetite continues to expect what it 
has been whetted on -  trouble.” 
And here lies the core of the 
point I want to make. In the 
remaining m onths of 1995 and in 
the years to come, I expect a 
decline in the intensity of Latin 
American coverage by the United 
States English media.
Latin America is moving toward 
free m arket democracies, toward 
more open political systems. This is 
good news, and that is the problem. 
Good new is hard to cover. It is dif­
ficult for an editor to justify stories 
on steady progress in Chile, a coun­
try with economic growth of 7 per­
cent a year. It is m uch easier to 
dedicate energy to the collapse of 
the Mexican peso, a story that has 
implications in the U nited States, 
not to m ention the impact on the 
em erging countries all the way 
down to the Southern Cone.
Calamity is what makes a story, or 
at least the possibility of one.
Mexico is a top story. There is a 
great deal to be reported  about 
Mexico: w hether it will come out of 
the peso crisis intact; whether 
social unrest will settle; or whether 
the crisis will eventually support a 
wave of illegal immigration. Still to 
be answered is the degree to which 
drug traffickers have infiltrated the 
government. There are unfinished 
investigations of major political 
assassinations. But Mexico is a big 
story not so m uch because of its 
im portance as a Latin American 
country, but because of its sheer 
proximity to the United States.
U.S. coverage of Latin America is 
not driven solely by what is happen­
ing in the region. Now that major 
television networks do not have 
bureaus in the area -  forcing corre­
spondents to cover ten countries at 
a time -  coverage decisions are dri­
ven by what Washington is doing in 
terms of policy.
Cuba will be covered much more 
extensively in the coming months; 
that’s because the U.S. has decisions 
to make. The real questions are: 
what is the fate of thousands of 
Cuban refugees in Guantanam o, 
and should the em bargo remain or 
be lifted? There is also debate on 
what the adm inistration will do in 
relation to the Burton-Helms bill 
that puts sanctions on companies 
dealing with Cuba.
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In reality, Cuba deserves much 
more attention than it has been 
given. The last time we heard 
extensively about Cuba was during 
the refugee crisis. Many develop­
ments happening right now are 
being ignored. Unfortunately, some 
believe that there is no story in 
Cuba without a resurgence of a mas­
sive flow of refugees to the coasts of 
Florida or absent the fall of Fidel 
Castro from power.
When that happens there is no 
doubt that coverage will be massive. 
As Don Hamilton, head of the Latin 
American division at the U.S. 
Inform ation Agency put it, “Even 
though Cuba does not represent a 
national security threat anymore, 
even though the cold war is over, 
Fidel, like M adonna, will always 
attract the press.” This is true; the 
press never misses the moves of 
celebrities. Fidel Castro, a contro­
versial, compelling character, is 
treated as such.
Drug trafficking as an issue for 
press coverage could gain im por­
tance as the debate for the U.S. 
presidential election heats up. We 
have already heard conservative 
Republicans urging a tougher 
stance from the current administra­
tion toward the drug-producing 
countries of Latin America. The 
Republicans -  who perceive the cur­
rent d rug policy as a weakness of 
the Clinton adm inistration -  see 
the topic of drugs as an issue that 
can provide them  political advan­
tage.
This coincides with stronger 
voices in Latin America urging 
Washington to see this issue from 
another perspective. I just re turned  
from a trip to Peru, where I covered 
the presidential election. President
Alberto Fujimori w ondered why the 
U.S. m edia does not concentrate on 
the tons of cocaine that are still able 
to en ter the country. He com­
plained about the lack of stories 
regarding the network in the U.S. 
that facilitates the entrance and dis­
tribution of drugs.
The growing anti-immigration 
feelings in the U nited States will be 
another issue as the electoral debate 
in the United States draws near. The 
media will probably report more 
about isolationist sentiments.
We will also probably hear more 
about Jesse Helms, given his new 
power chairing the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and his 
strong feelings about certain Latin 
American issues. As a m atter of 
fact, one of my colleagues at CNN 
describes Mr. Helms as the “political 
Molotov cocktail” for foreign policy 
initiatives: Not strong enough to 
destroy them, but strong enough to 
cause trouble.
What the media has not focused 
on yet is the threat of social polar­
ization in Latin America. While 
most governments in the region are 
successfully pushing through neolib­
eral economic reforms, social needs 
pay a price. The reforms are hu rt­
ing the poor disproportionately. If 
this problem  is not addressed, we 
could be seeing social explosions 
throughout Latin America. We saw 
a small example of this on April 18, 
when the government of Bolivia 
had to declare a state of siege to 
control discontent in the working 
class.
In the meantime, since the atten­
tion of the U.S. m edia in foreign 
affairs still focuses on security prob­
lems, Latin America will appear less 
in the news than Russia, China or
the Middle East. If reporting 
reflects that reality, Latin America 
will continue second tier after Asia 
and Europe, though it will probably 
fare better than Africa.
Not everyone, however, sees the 
relative silence of coverage of Latin 
America as something negative. 
Frank Sesno, CNN anchor and 
deputy bureau chief in Washington, 
thinks that to some extent this 
might be healthy.
“We are living in a transitional 
period,” he said. “I am optimistic 
that this time will serve to help the 
media evolve from the xenophobic 
coverage, which in the past charac­
terized Latin America as a group of 
‘Banana Republics in turm oil,’ into 
a more complex reporting where 
Americans will begin to appreciate 
that the well-being of the American 
worker indeed depends upon what 
happens in Mexico.”
We at CNN have adopted this phi­
losophy by consistently opening 
more bureaus in Latin America and 
expanding our Spanish language 
coverage to six shows a day. CNN 
Spanish is fundamentally interested 
in covering social issues and long­
term  trends in the region. We are 
closely watching the efforts of Latin 
American countries to diversify 
their economies and open their 
markets.
But, as we all know, coverage of 
these kinds of stories involves m ore 
reportorial skill, more reporting 
time, and, consequently, more 
money. It is all worth it. Americans 
would benefit from the knowledge 
that El Salvador is still in Central 
America, and that Guatemala exists 
before and after Congressman 
Torricelli. ■
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The Mote in Thy Brother’s Eye...
Daniel Samper Pizano
T
he world’s nations are 
not unlike schoolchild­
ren: Every so often they 
must show proof that 
they deserve a good- 
conduct certificate. In 
the case of schoolchildren, that cer­
tificate is granted by the hall monitor. 
In the case of the world's nations, the 
grantor is the United States, whose 
government draws up — in 
Olympian conceit — a list of good 
and bad nations that inhabit this 
planet. The problem is that every 
time it refuses to certify a nation, the 
United States gains international 
trade advantages. It’s as if a teacher 
were entitled to take home the books 
and bicycle of any student to whom 
the teacher refused to give a hall 
pass.
The countries most severely sub­
jected to the arbitrariness of the 
“m onitor of the N orth” are those that 
are plagued by drug trafficking. It’s 
not enough for them to suffer the 
violence and the corruption of the 
drug cartels; they must also put up 
with the whims of the examiner in 
Washington. Whenever certification 
time nears, these sorry nations must 
wait for the m urder of a few judges 
or cabinet ministers, and hope for 
drug-related terrorist attacks that 
leave at least 20 citizens blown to bits. 
Otherwise the monitor might refuse 
to award the good-conduct medal. If 
things continue as they are now, it 
might be wiser to establish good-con­
duct certification for the medal giver. 
It would be only fair. Someone 
should watch the watchman.
Daniel Samper Pizano is a Colombian 
journalist. This article is reprinted 
with the permission of the author.
The problem is that every 
time it refuses to certify a 
nation, the United States 
gains international trade 
advantages.
In the same way that countries 
plagued by organized crime are 
handed a list of requirem ents to 
meet in order to please the grantor 
of diplomas, there should be mini­
mum requirem ents set down for 
nations that presume to instruct oth­
ers in probity. The country in ques­
tion:
1) Must show proof of its ability to 
combat the drug trade. If nar­
cotics consumption in its own 
backyard increases, it is ill-pre- 
pared to instruct others on how 
to curb it.
2) Must not have any elected may­
ors known to be drug addicts or 
to prom ote drug use.
3) Above all, must not have any re­
elected mayors with a drug- 
related prison record.
4) Should not perm it the cultiva­
tion of m arijuana on its soil, or 
the production of hallucinogens 
in its laboratories, or the export 
of those venoms to o ther coun­
tries.
5) Must quash the laundering of 
drug money.
6) Must not perm it the uncon­
trolled sale of chemical sub­
stances needed to process 
cocaine or heroin.
7) Should not pretend that drug 
use is limited to movie, rock 
music, and television circles. 
Remember Wall Street.
8) Should not sell weapons to 
drug traffickers so that they may 
slay authorities in countries 
where drugs are produced.
9) Should be untainted by allega­
tions that (a) drugs have been 
consumed in the presidential 
palace; (b) narcotics have been 
purchased by secret service 
agents; (c) drugs have been 
traded for weapons to combat 
communism; (d) its authorities 
have connived with drug traf­
fickers; (e) presidents and Mafia 
or other organized-crime figures 
have had secret understandings.
10) Must not offer reduced sen­
tences to imprisoned drug deal­
ers in exchange for untrue state­
ments to support the claims of 
anti-drug officials.
11) Must not block, for selfish rea­
sons, the im portation of legal 
products from countries that 
attem pt to replace coca or 
poppy plantations with other 
crops that will benefit that 
region.
12) Must never have sponsored 
assassination attempts or terror­
ist acts in other countries for 
political reasons.
13) May not perm it the bribing of 
foreign authorities.
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14) Must employ alert and honest 
air traffic controllers, capable of 
spotting airplanes that enter its 
air space carrying illicit cargo.
15) Must guarantee the incorrupt­
ibility of its customs agents.
16) Must be able to state that it does 
not pressure the media to dis­
seminate self-serving information 
about events in other countries.
17) Must be hom e to a press corps 
that strictly observes the ethical 
rule of giving the defendant 
an opportunity to defend him­
self.
18) Must have captured a large 
num ber of drug-traffic chief­
tains in the past 12 months.
19) Should be able to guarantee (as 
minimum proof of its struggle 
against drug trafficking) that 
no drugs are sold inside its 
prisons.
20) May not pocket 80 cents on 
each drug-related dollar.
21) Should not prop up, for reasons 
of political convenience, sinister 
Third World characters involved 
in drug trafficking.
To me, it does no t seem excessive 
to dem and that only those countries 
that m eet these basic requirem ents 
may issue good-conduct certificates 
to their equals in the war against 
drugs. Let those that d on’t m eet 
them  go to reform  school. And let 
the reader judge if Washington has 
any authority to hand out moral 
diplomas. ■
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The “Demos” in Democracy
George C. Biddle
O
n January 24, 
enraged and frustrat­
ed by the govern­
m ent’s delay in car­
rying out promised 
social programs for 
demobilized soldiers, over 1,000 ex­
combatants representing the 
Association of the Demobilized of 
the Armed Forces of El Salvador 
(ADEFAES) forcibly occupied the 
Legislative Assembly and the 
Finance Ministry in San Salvador. 
The protesters took 13 members of 
Congress and 70 government 
employees hostage. After two days 
of negotiations with the governm ent 
and ONUSAL (United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador), 
the ex-combatants abandoned their 
positions and released the hostages. 
Ex-Sergeant Mauricio Cornejo, who 
led the negotiations for ADEFAES, 
said the deal that was struck includ­
ed governm ent promises to provide 
land, credit, training and housing 
for 5,000 form er members of the 
Salvadoran Armed Forces.
This violent action represented 
the fourth time since December of
1993 that ADEFAES, an organiza­
tion of 15,000, had seized the 
Assembly, underscoring the fragility 
of the peace process and the diffi­
culty of achieving lasting reconcilia­
tion in El Salvador. In a recant con­
versation, Ana Guadalupe Martinez,
George C. Biddle is the president of the 
Washington-based Institute for Central 
American Studies (ICAS). ICAS pro­
vided technical assistance in establish­
ing Centro DEMOS and continues to 
assist it in many aspects of its pro­
gram.
form er guerrilla leader and now 
vice president of the Legislative 
Assembly, said that she sees a 
change in the mentality of leaders 
and groups across the political and 
ideological spectrum. Martinez 
fears that traditional viewpoints are 
resurfacing and that the polariza­
tion of Salvadoran society is increas­
ing, not decreasing. As evidence of 
this, she pointed to the recent em er­
gence of a num ber of new political 
parties. “There is too much ortho­
doxy on the right and the left -  no 
one wants to listen,” she noted.
Working to build a lasting peace 
after a 12-year civil war that claimed 
m ore than 75,000 lives, El Salvador 
is also confronting a long history of 
intolerance, economic disparity, and 
violence. Three years after the end 
of the war, it is evident that divisive­
ness and violence remain realities.
To succeed in constructing a peace­
ful, democratic society, Salvadorans 
will have to be vigilant in their com­
m itm ent to communication, under­
standing and compromise.
One week after the conclusion of 
the dramatic events at the Legis­
lative Assembly, ex-Sergeant 
Cornejo approached the Center for 
Strategic Studies for Strengthening 
Salvadoran Democracy, known in 
Spanish as Centro DEMOS, and 
asked if he could become a partici­
pant in the center’s annual course 
for national leaders which had 
begun the previous November. He 
was accepted as a midyear partici­
pant.
Centro DEMOS is a nonpartisan 
organization which sponsors an 
intensive academic course that 
brings together leaders from the dif­
ferent sectors of Salvadoran society 
to attend lectures, discuss interna­
tional and national issues, and 
become better inform ed about the 
problems confronting El Salvador. 
Based in San Salvador, the center is 
unique because it provides a neu­
tral, pluralistic forum  for sustained 
study, dialogue and debate in a soci­
ety known for its polarity. Through 
sustained interaction, Centro 
DEMOS strives to respond to the 
urgent need for mutual understand­
ing, tolerance and reconciliation 
among the diverse interests of the 
fragm ented Salvadoran society.
The DEMOS initiative is based on 
the premise that El Salvador will not 
develop peacefully and dem ocrati­
cally until the com peting interests 
in society know and understand 
each other and begin to rely on 
open discussion of differences, 
negotiation strategies and com pro­
mise rather than hostile or destruc­
tive confrontations. As one observ­
er of the center put it, civil society 
“will be strengthened to the extent 
to which each sector broadens its 
horizons and learns to understand, 
tolerate and accept political, philo­
sophical and ideological solutions 
o ther than its own.” The cen ter’s 
goal is to establish, maintain and 
consolidate horizontal lines of com­
munication am ong society’s differ­
en t interest groups in order to mini­
mize the potential for violent con­
frontation and polarization and 
explore the possibilities for coopera­
tion, developm ent and consensual 
problem solving.
Centro DEMOS’ methodology is 
straightforward. The center invites 
60 associations, institutions, organi­
zations, political parties and govern­
m ent bodies to select a senior repre­
sentative to participate in its annual 
course. Ideally, the center wants to
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attract emerging leaders who can 
represent their sector from a posi­
tion of authority and who will 
remain in a leadership position for 
some time to come. The 78 partici­
pants in this year’s course include 
representatives from labor, business, 
campesino organizations, universi­
ties, religious institutions, the mili­
tary, various branches of govern­
ment, most political parties, NGOs, 
professional associations and special 
interest groups. The widest range 
of social, political and economic 
perspectives is represented.
Centro DEMOS brings these lead­
ers together three days a week for 
five hours per day over an eight- 
m onth period in a specially 
designed conference room  at the 
Salvadoran Association of Engineers 
and Architects. This year’s course 
began on November 10, 1994 and 
ended on June 15th -  91 sessions in 
all. The participants are paid a 
small stipend for attendance at each 
session. Centro DEMOS is an inclu­
sive organization and wants to 
ensure there is no discrimination 
based on financial ability.
The curriculum  for the course is 
designed by the center’s staff and is 
divided into three stages. Stage one 
analyzes the present international 
situation, El Salvador’s place in the 
world and im portant general con­
cepts such as the rule of law, m od­
ernization of the state and sustain­
able development, to name a few. 
Stage two focuses on the critical 
economic, social, political, military 
and geographic issues facing El 
Salvador. The primary topics in 
each of these areas are selected by a 
democratic vote of all the participat­
ing groups. This year’s topics 
include: “The New Role of the
Aim ed Forces;” “The World 
Economy and the Effects of 
NAFTA;” “The Political Party 
System: The Only Way to Access 
Political Power?;” “Integral Social 
Development;” and “The Judgm ent 
of the International Court of 
Justice: Its Implications.” The final 
stage of the curriculum  is devoted 
to the theory, methodology and 
application of strategic analysis and 
planning. During this im portant 
stage, the participants study differ­
ent approaches to strategic problem 
solving and apply them  to the issues 
they have analyzed throughout the 
course. This allows the diverse 
group of participants the opportuni­
ty to address difficult problems 
together and apply alternative solu­
tions to the challenges facing 
Salvadoran society.
The express purpose of 
the project’s design is to 
maximize the potential of 
sustained face to face 
dialogue.
Each session of the course typical­
ly begins with a plenary conference 
in which a diverse group of interna­
tional and national experts present 
differing views on the given topic. 
This is followed by a question and 
answer period and then a brief 
break for dinner, where the partici­
pants can interact informally. After 
the break, they divide into four 
working groups to analyze and 
debate the presentations as well as 
present their own distinct views. At
the end of the session, they recon­
vene in a plenary forum  to discuss 
and debate the findings of the work­
ing groups.
Centro DEMOS attempts not only 
to educate and widen the horizons 
of the individual participants, it also 
provides the initial point of contact 
to enhance interaction am ong com­
peting sectors within El Salvador -  
the very essence of civil society. 
Participants learn as much from one 
another as they do from the guest 
speakers. Simply put, the express 
purpose of the project’s design is to 
maximize the potential of sustained 
face to face dialogue -  thus the 
intensity and the length of the 
course. The ultimate sviccess of 
peace and democracy in El Salvador 
depends on the ability of the differ­
ent sectors of society to com m uni­
cate more effectively and, at the 
very minimum, to listen to, under­
stand and tolerate opposing view­
points.
Centro DEMOS is by no means a 
panacea. It is but one mechanism 
am ong countless that are needed to 
strengthen civil society and sustain 
the process of peace and reconcilia­
tion in El Salvador. The DEMOS 
initiative does not pretend to effect 
radical change am ong individuals or 
to solve all the country’s problems.
It does, however, strive to provide 
an environm ent conducive to modi­
fying attitudes. Although attitudinal 
changes are difficult to measure, 
there have been some tangible and 
positive results.
One piece of anecdotal evidence 
is particularly moving. O ne of the 
participants from the Legislative 
Assembly this year is Francisco 
Mena Sandoval. During the war, 
Sandoval defected to the insurgents
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from the Armed Forces, where he 
had been a captain. While in the 
army, he served under the com­
m and o f then Colonel Mauricio 
Vargas, who later became a General, 
Deputy Chief of Staff, and the 
Armed Forces representative to the 
peace negotiations. As com m ander 
of a guerrilla unit during the war, 
Sandoval led an attack on the 
Army’s Second Brigade at Santa 
Ana, which at the time was defend­
ed by Colonel Vargas. During the 
battle that ensued, Sandoval shot 
Vargas in the arm. The two had 
never spoken or reconciled until 
this year, when Vargas came to 
speak at Centro DEMOS. Following 
Vargas’s presentation, the staff at 
DEMOS brought the two men 
together. In an emotional exchange 
in front of o ther participants, they 
shook hands and talked briefly.
A nother example of Centro 
DEMOS’ impact is the recent cre­
ation of an association of Centro 
DEMOS graduates. Alumni from 
Centro DEMOS’ first course have 
established their own organization 
to continue their dialogue and 
interaction. More importantly, they 
have form ed working groups with 
broad representation to address spe­
cific problems facing the country. 
One group is working with students 
from the National University to 
develop approaches to stem the 
growing tide of gang violence, 
another is working with Habitat for 
Humanity to help m eet the need for 
low-cost housing (in fact a majority 
of the national board of Habitat is 
comprised of DEMOS graduates), 
and the final group is working on 
an AIDS prevention campaign.
Centro DEMOS was not an easy 
organization to establish. It 
required a great deal of determ ina­
tion and political will. Presently, the 
center is governed by a foundation, 
FUNDEMOS, which is comprised of 
a variety of Salvadoran leaders, 
am ong them  Joaquin Villalobos, a 
form er com m ander of the FMLN
and a leader of the Democratic 
Party; Saul Suster, form er director 
of ANTEL, the telephone company 
and one of form er President 
Alfredo Cristiani’s closest advisors; 
and Father Walter Guerra, director 
of CARITAS for Central America 
and Mexico. Just like the partici­
pants and the foundation, the staff 
also reflects the diversity of 
Salvadoran society.
Until now, the Center has been 
entirely financed by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development. 
Centro DEMOS is working to attract 
support from others in the interna­
tional community as well as from 
within El Salvador. To do this, the 
center must continue to be vigilant 
in m aintaining its nonpartisanship 
and the quality of its academic 
course. If this occurs, Centro 
DEMOS can continue to play a con­
structive role by building bridges 
among distinct interests in El 
Salvador.
Centro DEMOS’ methodology and 
structure leave it open as a model 
that may prove replicable and effec­
tive in other societies facing similar 
challenges as El Salvador. Without 
question, the needs of each society 
and the conditions within each coun­
try are distinct. Where the political 
will exists, however, the Centro 
DEMOS approach could be used suc­
cessfully to strengthen democracy, 
civil society and peace.
It remains to be seen whether ex- 
Sergeant Cornejo and ADEFAES will 
change their approach. At the very 
least, through Centro DEMOS, 
Cornejo will be exposed to democra­
tic dialogue and the gamut of opin­
ions and interests in the country. 
Already, im portant back channel 
communication is occurring between 
him and another participant,
Edgardo Zelaya, an ARENA deputy 
in the Legislative Assembly. This can 
only serve to aid the cause of conflict 
prevention, democracy and peace. ■
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Chronicle of a Death Foretold
Yvon Grenier
I
ntellectuals are producers 
and disseminators of political 
ideas. Although the concept 
was coined less than a centu­
ry ago in France during the 
Dreyfus affair, the intellectu­
al’s libido dominandi has im memori­
al roots: one recalls antiquity’s 
philosopher-king; the professor of 
the Middle Ages (called “dictatore”) , 
craving to rule Christendom ; the 
reckless philosophe surfing on the 
waves of the French revolution. 
T here were also gurus, artists and, 
m ore recently, social scientists, all 
with som ething in common: an 
aspiration to define the way people 
are governed.
Perhaps because all definitions of 
intellectuals are self-definitions, as 
Zygmunt Bauman pointed out, they 
also tend to come with a thesaurus 
of self-laudatory features. Intellec­
tuals are free-spirited rebels and 
would ra ther sip hem lock than 
renounce their muse, freedom. 
Money and power? These hovering 
giants, like Baudelaire’s albatross, 
scorn such worldly temptations.
But facts are hard things. 
Intellectuals have cheered for a 
variety of Spartas (if possible from 
some decadently democratic 
Athens) m ore often than they care 
to remem ber. They could easily be 
singled out, over the ages, as the
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most enthusiastic devotees of the 
bonfire, guillotine, re-education 
camps, and other purifying devices. 
In fact, the case could probably be 
made that dictatorship, being the 
trium ph of an idea, is a m uch more 
“natu ral” option for an intellectual 
than any form of open society, 
made of hollow procedures and 
ignoble compromises am ong ordi­
nary people. Finally, because the 
intelligentsia is a form of nobility, it 
usually loves social deference and 
considers em ancipation from m ate­
rial preoccupations as a natural 
right.
The obsession with 
“facts,  ”  curiously, exists 
in a genuine world of 
fantasy, with its own 
rules, intellectual 
currents, temple, etc.
Fortunately, there are quite a few 
exceptions to this rule, the 
Dreyfusards themselves being the 
first and most illustrious one. In 
their quest for the foundation of a 
“new society,” intellectuals have 
denounced real injustices in their 
own country and abroad. 
Nevertheless, because most of the 
Western great thinkers have 
espoused some form of ideocracy, 
shouldn’t we welcome the fact that 
the intellectual -  that is, the func­
tion of the intellectual -  is threat­
ened by extinction almost every­
where? Before reaching any con­
clusion on this, some clarifications 
are warranted.
P r o f e s s io n a l s  a n d  G e n d e l e t t r e s  
It is useful to distinguish intellec­
tuals from either professionals (tec- 
nicos) or gendelettres (persons of let­
ters). Professionals are those highly 
com petent persons in the technical 
sense, who do not wield influence 
outside of their specific discipline. 
Gendelettres, on the o ther hand, can 
be defined as highly cultivated but 
contemplative individuals whose 
influence on public affairs is either 
nil or unintentional. From these 
idealized types one can analyze the 
social function of some relevant 
social actors: how m uch of a pro­
fessional a n d /o r  ideologue a m an­
agem ent guru is, for instance. A 
social scientist is arguably a combi­
nation of professional and intellec­
tual -  m ore of the form er in North 
America, m ore of the latter in Latin 
America. An intellectual, even a 
politician, has to be a bit of a gen- 
delettre in Europe, a bit of a profes­
sional in N orth America, and so on. 
The extinction of intellectuals does 
not equate with either anti-intellec- 
tualism or a renunciation of the 
em ancipatory power of knowledge.
It means the disappearance of the 
kind of social actor whose dom i­
nant feature is to be an intellectual: 
i.e. to seek political influence and 
status through the power of ideas.
C a se  S t u d y : T h e  A m e r ic a s
The American continent, featur­
ing different fragments of the 
European matrix as well as hetero­
geneous patterns of development, 
offers a contrasted tableau of the 
conditions conducive to the blos­
soming or extinction of intellectuals 
in our times. The diagnosis: (a) 
intellectuals are a curiosity in the 
U.S. and English Canada; (b) they
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are in decline in Ladn America; but 
(c) they are still vigorous in the 
mostly French-speaking Canadian 
province of Quebec.
Fa r e w e l l  t o  I n t e l l e c t u a l s
“As m odernity advances, the intel­
lectual retreats,” says P. Nettl. 
Moreover, “The social scientist, far 
from being a new form of intellectu­
al, may really be his mortal enemy 
as well as his replacem ent in soci­
ety.” Why? For Nettl, “The intellec­
tual's role in [advanced Western] 
society has been underm ined pri­
marily by increasing specialization, 
by different but professional 
groundings of authority, by separa­
tion between culture and politics, 
and the breakup of unitary cultures
-  or at least the hierarchy of better 
as opposed to worse culture.” To 
this list drawn up in the 1960s we 
should now annex the relative and 
probably transitory retreat of 
antiliberal ideologies in the West.
Intellectuals have no political 
space: politicians and lobbyists 
monopolize access to political 
power. The m edia play the role of 
interm ediary between the political 
class and the apathetic masses. 
Would-be intellectuals despise the 
media. The media ignore them. In 
the cities, a “new knowledge class” 
(Peter Berger) of “lifestyle engi­
neers” (Hansfried Kellner) or 
“moral en trepreneurs” (James 
Hunter) strives to shape specific 
social activities or “issues” (the envi­
ronm ent, gender, taxes, etc.). 
However, their impact remains 
ephem eral and particularistic, hav­
ing more to do with marketing a 
product than shaping the res publica.
Social scientists, most of the time, 
are quasi-intellectuals. But the
m odern social scientist is primarily, 
as Max Weber anticipated, an over­
specialized professional. This is 
particularly true in N orth America, 
where the quest for professional­
ized social sciences (i.e., the expul­
sion of value judgem ents) has been 
dom inant. Lewis Feuer recalls that 
during the 1950s in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, “To call a person an 
‘intellectual’ was to suggest that this 
was an educated person who had 
failed to com plete his work, who 
lacked discipline, who had intellect 
but not character; he was neither a 
scientist nor a scholar; a frivolous 
erudite: in short, a Parisian.” This 
celebration of science comes with a 
certain estrangem ent from social 
practices, an imperviousness to the 
ideological cycles that shape the 
public debate. (For example, the 
U.S. now imports massively from 
the French social sciences of the 
1960s, now totally demode in 
France). The notion of “magic 
realism", presumably m ore suited to 
characterize Latin American litera­
ture, captures the nature of this 
university-based Republique des lettres. 
The obsession with “facts,” curious­
ly, exists in a genuine world of fan­
tasy, with its own rules, intellectual 
currents, temples, etc.
In the 1960s, the counterculture 
movement, sweeping a whole gener­
ation in Western countries, opened 
a parenthesis in the American tradi­
tion. A new quest for community 
and some generational tribalism, 
coupled with timely political insta­
bility, generated extraordinary 
social and political fluidity. Gore 
Vidal recalls this period nostalgical­
ly when “politics and literature offi­
cially jo ined  forces. The politician 
had literary longings; the writer saw
himself as president.” A perfect 
time for intellectuals! Still, this was 
typically followed by a certain nor­
malization, a decline of the revolu­
tionary fervor. Capitalism opened 
its purse to a promising self-cen- 
tered generation, whereas the 
Democratic Party displaced its 
hegemonic center from the New 
Deal coalition to “new politics” and 
a newly affluent generation.
Arguably, the only situation 
amenable to converting politically 
autistic intellectuals into movers 
and shakers in this kind of environ­
m ent is one of deep collective trau­
ma: external or internal war, col­
lapse of political institutions, crisis 
of collective identity, nationalistic 
upsurge, generational clash, etc. 
Intellectuals should pray for the 
advent of a new charismatic era, 
one that would break the social grid 
and renew the hum an communities 
receptiveness to overarching social 
myths and ideologies.
T h e  D is t in c t  T r a d it io n
Sociopolitical developm ent in 
Latin America has been m ore con­
sonant with the active participation 
of intellectuals in the public sphere, 
for a num ber of reasons. First, one 
has a distinctive pattern  of elite 
reproduction. Elites in Latin 
America have typically been less dif­
ferentiated and “functional,” or 
more hom ogeneous than in N orth 
America. In fact, Latin Am erica’s 
elites are in many ways similar to 
the European continental model. 
For instance, French elites tend to 
be cumulard: they accumulate 
social, political, cultural and often 
economic roles. Politicians who 
aspire to the highest positions must 
display some mastery of lettres and
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philosophy, a reminiscence of the 
Middle Ages’ trivium of grammar, 
rhetoric and logic. All the same, in 
Latin America -  where power, not 
wealth, is the pivotal resource -  the 
low differentiation of elites is 
salient am ong cultural and political 
elites. Disciplines such as art or sci­
ence are not fully milked until their 
mastery is converted into some 
political (or “public”) capital. Latin 
American universities, with their 
emphasis on liberal professions, are 
more suited to form ing homo politi­
cos (the “surrounded m an” 
described by Glen C. Dealy) than 
solitary scientifics and technicians 
seeking im personal rewards.
Latin American elites are not a 
loose collection of interconnected 
but distinct heads of “functional 
groups.” They form  a fairly hom o­
geneous and selective club of 
rulers. Cultural, political, and eco­
nomic resources com m and social 
deference, but those resources are 
granted with, m ore than being a 
prerequisite for, m em bership to the 
club. Latin American intellectuals 
are largely defined by the nature of 
their relations with this club, to 
which many belong or aspire to 
belong. This explains why the cate­
gory of intellectual is so unspecific 
in Latin America: as Jorge G. 
Castaneda, after many others, 
pointed out: “Almost anyone who 
writes, paints, acts, teaches, speaks 
out, or even sings, becomes an 
‘intellectual’.” A society that values 
what you are m ore than what you 
do, and where the mastery of uni­
versal discourses com m and more 
deference than instrum ental reason 
and technical skills, is one where 
intellectuals, all things being equal, 
are m ore likely to find rewards for 
their talents.
What is more, low levels of social 
mobilization also enhance the polit­
ical influence of intellectuals. In 
Latin America, the relatively low 
level of social mobilization and the 
weakness of the indigenous entre­
preneurial class confers to the edu­
cated stratum, especially the cultur­
al elites (including the intellectu­
als), an inordinate pull vis-a-vis both 
the governm ent and the masses.
Second, one has a distinctive pat­
tern of circulation of political elites. 
In Latin America, as in most m od­
ernizing countries, politics is m uch 
less “institutionalized” and dem oc­
ratic than in N orth America (minus 
Mexico). Political parties enjoy no 
monopoly in the business of politi­
cal representation and mobiliza­
tion. As a m atter of fact, o ther sea­
soned “representative forces,” such 
as the army, students, the church or 
unions, have as much, if no t more, 
of a legitimate say in shaping poli­
cies than regular politicians. This 
kind of setting invites all actors who 
m aster political discourse (includ­
ing, nowadays, social scientists) and 
who enjoy organizational resources 
to participate actively in politics.
With the emergence 
and consolidation of 
democracy in the region., 
intellectuals are likely to 
lose groundretreating  
into the professional or 
gendelettres roles.
Interestingly enough, with the 
em ergence and consolidation of 
democracy in the region, coupled 
with the disqualification of 
Castroist-like political activism in 
universities, intellectuals are likely 
to lose ground, retreating into pro­
fessional or gendelettres roles. Latin 
American social scientists are now 
attem pting to em ulate the N orth 
American model, facing the new 
dilem ma of “publish or perish” 
instead of “praxis and perish.”
They are m ore busy com peting for
scarce resources than for some 
exclusive and entrancing position 
in deciphering/revolutionizing la 
realidad.
This impressionistic portrait of 
hem ispheric convergence deserves 
to be qualified, however, because 
of the resistance of a small political 
village in the northeast of the 
American continent. In the 
Canadian province of Quebec, 
vigorous Gaulois, arm ed with the 
ancestral magic potion of ethnic 
nationalism, are staunchly staving 
off the onslaughts of disenchant­
m ent and cultural fragm entation.
Q u e b e c
Beyond the Latin heritage, the 
mostly French-speaking province of 
Quebec arguably shares with Latin 
American societies a legacy of belat­
ed development, and hence a cer­
tain cult of the state conceived both 
as a guardian of national identity 
and as the prim e agent of m odern­
ization. A nother com m on feature 
is the early convergence between 
the Roman Catholic Church and 
the state. In Quebec, this success­
ful m arriage strongly contributed to 
cem enting a “national cu lture” that 
celebrates order, monistic political 
values, paternalism  and protection­
ism against unholy foreign influ­
ences. Unlike English Canadians, 
Quebecois were no t “born free”: 
the conservative and traditional 
provincial Prem ier Maurice 
Duplessis (1936-39, 1944-59), who 
ruled with the support of a reac­
tionary Catholic Church, had to be 
uprooted. The patricidal bro ther­
hood that launched the so-called 
Quiet Revolution in the 1960s con­
sisted of a group o f educated young 
m en and women, who took a leave 
of absence from the Church or 
Catholic educational institutions in 
order to capture the state apparatus 
and turn  it (and ergo, themselves) 
into the m odern, secular guardian 
of the collective identity. The previ­
ous generation offered little, if any,
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resistance: the so-called baby- 
boom ers of the postwar period were 
just too num erous. A few colleges 
and universities in two cities 
(M ontreal and Quebec) churned 
out the technocrats for the 
takeover. Social scientists found 
positions in commissions of inquiry, 
planning boards and halls of gov­
ernm ent -  even before graduation. 
They felt the warm em brace of a 
society that needed them. As in 
Latin America, the state became the 
main employer for social scientists. 
In contrast with Latin America, 
however, the vigorously growing 
state had money to pay them.
O n the economic side of the 
Quiet Revolution, the nationaliza­
tion of electricity in the 1960s 
became the building block upon 
which a new “cargo cult rhythm ” 
was elaborated. For three decades, 
the whole Creole ruling elite in 
Quebec worshiped the huge dams 
of the wild N orth, swearing to 
defend the “integrity of the Quebec 
territo ry” against aboriginal territo­
rial claims. The flooded N orth is 
conceived as a repository of 
Quebecois crude power, refined by 
the post-clerical Leviathan. Thanks 
to Hydro Quebec (as in Mexico 
with PEMEX), the illusion of the 
state’s self-sustainability could be 
created. The national bourgeoisie 
will eventually rise and play its his­
torical role, but only thanks to the 
real demiurge: the national tech­
nocracy.
The love story between this gen­
eration of technocrats and the state 
(that is, the love story of a genera­
tion of technocrats with itself) is 
now reaching its baroque denoue­
m ent with the election of the sepa­
ratist Parti Quebecois (PQ) in 1994. 
The PQ  seeks the “norm al” sequel 
to the quiet revolution: an inde­
pendent, full-grown nation state. 
And intellectuals are asked to 
churn out “identity” products, to 
design new institutional constructs, 
to figure out strategies and tactics
for before, during, and after the 
Homeric referendum  of Quebec 
sovereignty (due this year). Most of 
the Quebec intellectuals, old and 
young, have already been “national­
ized.” The artists, cherished by the 
Quebec population, relish Ottawa’s 
no-strings-attached largess. 
Nevertheless, their com m itm ent to 
separation remains virtually m anda­
tory in le Quebec. In short, intel­
lectuals have a 19th century-like 
mission to accomplish: to erect a 
nation-state and to strengthen a 
national culture.
English Canadians find it m uch 
harder to relate to one state, one 
territory, one culture, one nation. 
They are a dispersed lot, breathing 
through a maze of diverse, some­
times conflicting, identities.
English Canada is a natural federa­
tion. In the country as a whole, the 
National Energy Program did not 
have the same impact as the nation­
alization of electricity in Quebec.
In fact, it created an opportunity 
for intra-elite disputes, fostering 
division am ong provinces and 
regions. There was no revolution, 
even a quiet one. In terms of “civic 
culture” or political values (percep­
tion of the role of the state, the role 
of business, Church and politics, 
etc.), English Canada can probably 
be located somewhere between 
Quebec and the U.S., and leaning 
m ore toward the latter.
Social sciences in English Canada 
were never the kind of Confucian 
wisdom they became in Quebec 
during the Q uiet Revolution.
Social scientists, especially econo­
mists, were recruited in provincial 
and federal bureaucracies, but they 
never captured the state the way a 
generation of educated Quebecois 
did. Key disciplines such as sociolo­
gy and political science were insti­
tutionalized in the 1960s and 1970s
-  that is, decades after their US 
counterparts -  but with some diffi­
culty. Political science, for exam­
ple, was perceived as the unfortu­
nate child of philosophy (contem ­
plative) and economics (purely 
technocratic).
Culturally, English Canada is 
m ore perm eable to American influ­
ence and m uch more self-conscious 
about it. Soft anti-Americanism is 
the minimal common denom inator 
of English Canadian political cul­
ture; not the privilege of the left as 
in Quebec. Scholars and journalists 
routinely argue w hether there is 
such a thing as a Canadian culture; 
recently, the Canadian Minister of 
M ulticulturalism held that there 
wasn’t. Clearly, the evocation of 
Canada's kindness and compassion, 
enshrined in our social programs, is 
no t enough. Consequently, there 
seems to be room  for the em er­
gence of nationalist intellectuals in 
English Canada, if only the overar­
ching conditions for such a devel­
opm ent were there. The disruption 
created by an eventual (though 
unlikely) separation of Quebec 
could do the trick. Deprived of 
most of its French com ponent, 
Canadians would be looking for 
myth-makers, capable of telling 
them  how different they are from 
the Yankees.
S u m m in g  U p
In sum, with the exception of 
Quebec and the potential exception 
of the ROC (Rest of Canada), the 
hem isphere features virtually no 
conditions am enable to the em er­
gence or resurrection of intellectu­
als. Democratization and obsoles­
cence of the idea of nation as an 
integrative entity, in addition to the 
globalization of the economy, con­
dem n the last nobility to convert its 
members into either professionals 
(including professionals of politics, 
or politicians) or gendelettres. If 
more would-be intellectuals were 
striving for liberty, equality, and the 
pursuit of private happiness, and 
not for some gemeinschaft of warriors 
and producers, this would be an 
unfortunate development. ■
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Defanging the Predatory State
Robert Maguire
A
s Americans grapple 
with redefining the 
terms of the “cove­
n an t” between those 
who are governed, 
Haitians are once 
again struggling to forge the first 
such contract in their nation’s histo­
ry. At its heart the struggle pits a 
recidivistic, powerful and resilient 
few against the vast majority of 
Haitian citizens. The few are resist­
ing the demise of their predatory 
state, where economic and political 
elites, with a supporting cast of mili­
tary and paramilitary thugs, prey on 
the rest of H aiti’s 7 million citizens 
for their own gratification. The 
many are seeking to ensure the 
em ergence of m odern democratic 
society, where elected leaders are 
accountable to citizens and eco­
nomic predation falls victim to fair 
com petition and rule of law.
Significant progress in defanging 
Haiti’s predators has been made 
since the Septem ber 1994 “interva- 
sion” of Haiti by the U.S.-led multi­
national force (MNF) and the sub­
sequent re tu rn  of governance by 
democratically-elected leaders.
That progress includes the depar­
ture from Haiti of the military 
coup’s three leaders, the destruc­
tion of the m ilitary’s coup-prone 
Heavy Weapons unit, the virtual 
demobilization of H aiti’s so-called 
army, and the collection, by the end 
of January, of approximately 30,000
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weapons through seizures and buy­
back programs.
It also includes the lawful separa­
tion of the police from the army, 
the opening of a professional police 
training academy, and the transfer 
in duties in late March to the U.N. 
Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti 
(UNMIH) following MNF assurance 
that H aiti’s overall environm ent is 
“safe and secure.” A 4,000-strong 
Interim  Public Security Force 
(IPSF), under the supervision of 
830 international police monitors, 
has also been created -  though it 
has no t been warmly received by 
most Haitians since 3,000 of its 
members are form er military per­
sonnel “recycled” by way of a one- 
week course on professional police 
procedure and respect for hum an 
rights. The 1,000 other members of 
the IPSF, refugees trained while in 
Guantanam o, have been m ore 
warmly received by H aiti’s ordinary 
citizens. The first 375 members of 
Haiti's perm anent, professionally- 
trained police were deployed follow­
ing their graduation from the 
police academy in May. As they are 
deployed, the perm anent police will 
replace the IPSF.
In spite of widespread fears and 
propaganda spread by coup leaders 
between 1991 and 1994, precious 
little violence or vengeance has 
em anated from the heretofore 
repressed population since the 
intervasion and the re tu rn  of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
O f special im portance to the U.S., 
all of these accomplishments have 
also witnessed an end to out-migra­
tion and the re tu rn  of many 
refugees. In Haiti, the same events 
have witnessed a reversal of the 
internal displacement that accom­
panied the coup and its subsequent 
reign of terro r against some
300,000 Haitians, many of whom 
make up community-based civil 
society organizations that will play a 
crucial role in building a dem ocrat­
ic future.
Im portant steps toward the evolu­
tion of a democratic society have 
occurred beyond the realm of 
H aiti’s military and police. Among 
them  is President Aristide’s oft- 
repeated call for reconciliation, fol­
lowed by tangible steps in that 
direction. The creation, in 
December 1994, of a 24-member 
private/public sector Presidential 
Commission for Economic Growth 
and M odernization is one such 
practical measure toward that end. 
Further, a legitimate ministerial gov­
ernm ent, led by businessm an/
Prime Minister Smark Michel, has 
begun the unenviable job  of 
rebuilding the plundered coun­
try.
In late January, the A ristide/ 
Michel governm ent secured inter­
national pledges of some $900 mil­
lion over the following 12-15 
months to support a reform-mind- 
ed social and economic reconstruc­
tion plan. The plan emphasizes cit­
izen and local governm ent empow­
erm ent, trade, and democratization 
of the economy, including the sale 
of state-owned enterprises. Finally, 
progress, albeit slow, is being made 
toward elections which will enable 
Haitians to choose the parliam en­
tarians, mayors, and town coun­
selors who will become key players 
in operationalizing and sustaining 
Haiti’s first contract for democratic 
governance and accountability.
Even though all these develop­
ments have placed Haiti under a
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glowing, silver cloud, it has a dark 
lining. An incident featuring one 
of H aiti’s most notorious thugs ju x ­
taposed the fragility of progress 
against the deeply rooted resistance 
to a democratic society and an end 
to predatory behavior.
An arms and materials cache 
uncovered by the MNF in Port-au- 
Prince in early February has been 
linked to Franck Romain, the for­
mer, Duvalierist mayor of that city, 
also alleged to be one of H aiti’s 
foremost paramilitary gang leaders. 
For weeks following this incident, 
Romain, who is implicated in such 
incidents as the November 1987 
voter massacre and the Septem ber
1988 S t.John Bosco church 
arson/m urder, rem ained at large, 
reportedly holding nocturnal gang 
meetings similar to those that pre­
ceded previous terrorist acts.
Despite the fact that he was sum­
m oned to m eet high-ranking MNF 
authorities, he was not detained. 
Subsequently, he quietly slipped 
into the Dominican Republic.
Rom ain’s case underscores several 
broad concerns. One is that 
despite the MNF’s arms seizures 
and buybacks, a m ultitude of 
weapons, including scores of semi­
automatics and hand grenades dis­
tributed between 1991 and 1994 by 
military and paramilitary leaders, 
still circulate. Given H aiti’s porous 
border with the Dominican 
Republic, it would not be surprising 
if the supply of underground arms 
in Haiti is not currently static.
Repeated requests by the 
Aristide/M ichel governm ent for the 
systematic disarming of the popula­
tion were declined by the MNF. 
While targeted efforts to disarm 
military and paramilitary thugs
increased somewhat between late 
January and the MNF’s departure 
on March 31 -  the Romain cache is 
a good example -  it is unlikely that 
any systematic disarm am ent will 
take place under the aegis of 
UNMIH. Visiting Washington in 
late January, Prime Minister Michel 
expressed concern that with only 
about 30 percent of H aiti’s thugs 
thus far disarmed, the security of 
electoral politics remains fragile.
The Haitian m ilitary’s 
symbiotic relationship with 
the country’s paramilitary 
thugs is the ultimate issue 
when it comes to defanging 
the preda tors and sustaining 
progress fa r  beyond the 
1996 departure of the U.N. 
peacekeepers.
O f perhaps greater concern is the 
fact that so many notorious charac­
ters like Romain also rem ain in cir­
culation in Haiti, basking in their 
continued legal and judicial 
impunity. To wit, when the MNF 
tu rned  over its detainees to the 
Haitian governm ent in late January, 
of the hundreds of alleged crimi­
nals and hum an rights abusers 
either rounded up by the MNF or 
turned  over peacefully by citizens, 
only 26 were tu rned  over to Haitian 
authorities. Others had been 
released by the MNF largely on the 
grounds that there was no function­
ing Haitian judicial system to follow- 
up on these cases, or that they had
“escaped” from prisons still under 
the control of individuals affiliated 
with the Haitian army. The current 
wave of m urder and organized 
crime is due, at least in part, to the 
fact that suspected criminals and 
rights abusers have not been 
detained.
In addition to Franck Romain, 
o ther notorious characters like 
Emmanuel Constant, the leader of 
the violent vigilante group FRAPH, 
have quietly slipped out of the 
country. In a dismaying episode of 
what was hopefully just bureaucratic 
incom petence, Constant is report­
edly somewhere in the U nited 
States. O ther lesser-known recidi­
vists have reportedly crossed the 
border to the Dominican Republic, 
to lurk there with their weapons 
until they feel it advantageous to 
return.
Some argue that since Septem ber 
the backbone of the Haitian army 
has been broken, and as a result, 
individual thugs and the gangs they 
once controlled have lost the 
um brella protecting them. Others 
argue that the Haitian army never 
had a single backbone to break. 
Regardless, without an end to 
impunity, destabilizing episodes of 
political terro r and organized crime 
will continue, particularly with elec­
tions on the horizon. Clearly, the 
ultimate solution of this problem  
calls for the existence of an honest, 
functioning judicial system and a 
secure prison system that can com­
plem ent the efforts of a reform ed 
police and a population seeking 
rule of law. Unfortunately, despite 
significant Haitian and in ternation­
al attention to these matters, this is 
not something that can be put 
together overnight, particularly
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since there has never been a func­
tioning judicial system in Haiti that 
has provided justice for all.
The Haitian military’s symbiotic 
relationship with the country's para­
military thugs is the ultimate issue 
when it comes to defanging the 
predators and sustaining progress 
far beyond the 1996 departure of 
the U.N. peacekeepers. Regardless 
of the aforem entioned trends 
toward demilitarization in Haiti, 
internationally-supported social and 
economic reconstruction plans 
advanced by the Haitian govern­
m ent still call for the reform ation 
of a 1,500-member arm ed force. 
Surely, if a citizen referendum  were 
held in Haiti to determ ine whether 
or not the country needs a military, 
practically all Haitians would vote 
NO. Indeed, a public opinion poll 
conducted in March under the aus­
pices of the Arias Foundation for 
Peace and Hum an Progress found 
62 percent of Haitians favored dis­
banding the army entirely. How the 
U.S. weighs in on this issue will ulti­
mately be of key im portance in 
determ ining the future of an army 
for Haiti. Presently, divergent views 
on the m atter circulate within both 
the White House and the Pentagon.
International presence thus far 
has helped to create a safer and 
m ore secure environm ent needed 
by Haitians to advance their efforts 
of democratic reform. The preda­
tors, though still lurking about, are 
also very uncertain of their future. 
As a result, optimism is growing 
that if those trying to forge a con­
tract for a democratic society and 
economy are violently attacked 
again, they will be able to withstand 
the assault.
During the slow, tedious work of 
consolidating reforms, H aiti’s lead­
ers seeking to forge and sustain a 
contract of accountable, democratic 
governance will need continued 
international support and decisive 
measures to ensure they remain out 
o f the predators’ grasp. ■
MEXICAN 
STUDIES
VOLUM E 10, NUM BER 2 / SUM M ER 1994
• Margarita Zires, Los mitos de la Virgen de Guadalupe. Su pro- 
ceso de construccion y reinterpretacion en el Mexico pasado y con- 
temporaneo
• Philip C. Kolin, The Mexican Premiere of Tennessee Williams’s
A Street Car Named Desire
•  Charles L. Davis and Kenneth M. Coleman, Neoliberal 
Economic Policies and the Potential for Electoral Change in 
Mexico
• George A. Collier, The Rebellion in Chiapas and the Legacy of 
Energy Development
• Martin C. Needier, The Consent o f the Governed? Coercion, 
Co-optation, and Compromise in Mexican Politics
• Lois Stanford, Analyzing Class Relations in Rural Mexico: 
Theoretical and Methodological Developments
□  Enter my subscription to MS/EM:
□  $23 Individual □  $46 Institution □  $15 Students 
□  $4 foreign postage (if outside US)
□  Payment enclosed
□  Charge my: □  Visa □  MasterCard
Card # Exp. Date
Signature
Name
Street
City State Zip
University o f California Press, Journals Division 
2120 Berkeley Way #5812, Berkeley, CA 94720-5812; 
or FAX (510) 642-9917 (Visa/MasterCard only).
16 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One
mencasance
the )Oth anniversary
ongress on K e;
November
re nee
ancc
T h is  3 0 t h  a n n iv e rs a ry  c o n fe re n c e  o f  th e  C o n g re s s  o n  R esearch in  D a n c e  w il l  b r in g  to g e th e r
ARTISTS, EDUCATORS, AND SCHOLARS TO ADDRESS DANCE, MYTH AND RITUAL FROM A VARIETY OF PERSPECTIVES, 
INCLUDING THE FIELDS OF ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, HISTORY, LITERATURE, ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, POPULAR 
CULTURE, GENDER STUDIES, AESTHETICS, RELIGION AND CRITICISM.
The conference is hosted by Florida International University's Intercultural Dance and M usic Institute, Latin American and 
Caribbean Center and Department o f Theatre and Dance, and the New  W orld School o f the Arts Dance D ivision.
For more inform ation, contact: Suzanne T. Duncan, Program Coordinator, or Dr. Andrea Mantell-Seidel, Conference Chair 
IN D A M I, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, M iam i, Florida 33199
Tel (305) 348-2894, Fax (305) 348-3593
Reports: Paraguay
Old Back Water
Frank O. Mora
P
erhaps there is no o ther 
country in the Western 
Hemisphere where histo­
ry repeats itself so often 
as in Paraguay. Today, 
m uch of what continues 
to tug at Paraguay’s fragile dem ocra­
cy is the legacy of its own political 
culture. The real challenge for 
Paraguay is whether it can overcome 
its turbulent and authoritarian past, 
principally the Stroessner legacy, 
before its rem nants snap and 
destroy this young democracy.
Long relegated to the back-burn- 
er of political and academic dis­
course, Paraguay has been a victim 
of geographic isolation and intellec­
tual neglect. It has been plagued by 
an irrational sense of insecurity and 
paranoia that began before inde­
pendence when the Jesuit missions 
were established to protect the 
Guarani Indians and the area from 
the com bined wrath of the 
Portuguese bandeirantes, the bar­
barism of the Chaco Indians, and 
the imperiousness of the portenos of 
Buenos Aires. After independence, 
the autocratic rule of Jose Caspar 
Rodriguez de Francia (1811-1840) 
closed off any form of participatory 
politics and regulated contact with 
the outside world, condem ning 
Paraguayans to a childlike depen­
dency on the state or “father” of the 
country and creating a provincial­
ism that tu rned  it into a cultural
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backwater. This was augm ented by 
the devastating effects of despotic 
rule and a calamitous war (1865- 
1870) in which about half the popu­
lation died.
Isolation has been the 
official policy of many of 
Paraguay’s authoritarian 
dictatorships, starting 
with Francia.
Political clientelism is both cause 
and effect of authoritarianism  in 
Paraguay. Personal relationships 
have traditionally dom inated all 
forms of political activity, which has 
retarded the developm ent of dem o­
cratic institutions in favor of caudil- 
lism, personalism, and patronage. 
This patron-client tradition has also 
contributed to the expansion of cor­
ruption, as a cause and conse­
quence of the absence of effective 
institutionalization. C orruption is 
most clearly manifest in the coun­
try’s long experience with contra­
band trade which, in addition to 
limiting the scope and role of insti­
tutional politics, demonstrates how 
their isolation and fear of external 
enemies have induced a reliance on 
illegal commerce to survive.
The best portrayal of Paraguayan 
society and culture was written by 
the award-winning novelist Augusto 
Roa Bastos in two works, 1, Supreme 
and Son of Man. Both novels pro­
vide a vivid portrayal of this brutal 
and tender land whose people have 
been subjected to tyranny, exploita­
tion, violence and state-sponsored 
corruption. This Paraguayan novel­
ist movingly captures the plight of 
many of his people who, through­
out history, have attem pted to resist 
brutal repression. He shows the 
humanity, pride, courage, and stub­
bornness that enable the people of 
Paraguay to go on living and fight­
ing back while most of the world 
turns a blind eye to the brutality.
Roa Bastos suggests that isolation 
from external influences has been 
the official policy of many of 
Paraguay’s authoritarian dictator­
ships, starting with the hermetic 
regime of Francia and ending with 
the paranoid kleptocracy of General 
Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989). 
These regimes hoped that by insu­
lating Paraguay from foreign influ­
ences and attention they could 
maintain their iron grip over the 
country without risking the criticism 
and ire of the international commu­
nity.
The Stroessner regime succeeded 
in m aintaining a low profile which 
helped limit international pressures 
and criticisms. Additionally, as the 
regime suppressed all attempts at 
developing the social sciences in 
Paraguay (this activity was consid­
ered “subversive”), the academic 
community outside of Paraguay fol­
lowed suit, making the country the 
least studied in the hemisphere.
The paucity of social science 
research on Paraguay illustrates this 
fact. Paraguay is largely absent from 
studies conducted and published in 
the U.S. and Europe on such con­
tem porary topics as democratic 
transition and political economy. 
Even with Stroessner gone, it seems 
that old habits are hard to over­
come.
It is within this historical, socio­
logical and international context
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that one must understand the rule 
and longevity of the Stroessner 
regime. Stroessner was the culmina­
tion of a long history of authoritari­
anism and patrimonialism. He 
clearly understood the history and 
political culture of the nation, and 
he emphasized symbolic elements 
and traditions that rem inded the 
population of its authoritarian past. 
His rule, however, cannot be solely 
attributed to cultural elements -  his 
keen political skills coupled with the 
“Stroessnerization” of the state, 
Colorado party, and arm ed forces 
explains the longevity of his regime. 
Stroessner used the Colorado party 
to solidify his power base by doling 
out thousands of governm ent jobs 
to its members and controlling the 
military by incorporating it into the 
party.
In conjunction with repression, 
co-optation, and marginalization, 
corruption played a pivotal role in 
“greasing” the wheels of this klep- 
tocracy. C orruption, which 
Stroessner believed to be the “price 
for peace” in Paraguay, pervaded 
every sector of Paraguayan society, 
particularly the arm ed forces from 
which he purchased and com pro­
mised their absolute loyalty. High 
ranking military and party officials 
enjoyed lucrative sinecures in state 
monopolies, controlling major com­
mercial fronts for narcotics, contra­
band, and prostitution.
Stroessner and his cronies turned 
Ciudad Presidente Stroessner (now 
Ciudad del Este) and other towns 
on the Brazilian border into out­
posts where all kinds of illegal activi­
ties were conducted -  this region 
became known as Paraguay’s “Far 
East.” For this reason, Paraguay 
received the well deserved reputa­
tion during the late 1960s of being 
the heart of corruption and contra­
band trade in South America. In 
short, Stroessner exacerbated and 
institutionalized all that had been 
negative of Paraguayan society and 
political culture. Carlos M iranda 
recently stated that the longevity of 
the Stroessner regime could be 
“found in the fabric o f Paraguayan 
society and in the way he tailored 
his role to that society.”
In the end, the coup of 
1989 left intact Stroessner’s 
structure of corruption. 
There was no fear of a 
military coup while one 
of their own governed.
Although Stroessner was over­
thrown in February 1989, the transi­
tion and the governm ent’s interna­
tional image continue to be ham ­
pered by the legacy of his reign. 
When General Andres Rodriguez 
staged the coup that overthrew his 
political mentor, it was not a com­
plete break with the past. In fact, 
many of the same faces and institu­
tions rem ained even though 
Rodriguez and the new government 
liberalized all forms of political 
activity. The democratic process 
rem ained incomplete because 
im portant enclaves or authoritarian 
rem nants im peded the process at 
different levels and dimensions.
The ruling Colorado party, though 
significantly fragmented, rem ained 
a dom inant force, and the military 
continued to hold on to its privi­
leged position in Paraguayan poli­
tics and economics. In the end, the 
coup of 1989 left intact Stroessner’s 
structure of corruption. There was 
no fear of a military coup while one 
of their own, General Rodriguez 
(1989-1993), governed and super­
vised a restricted “transition from 
above.”
The foundation of Paraguay’s 
fragile democracy began to shake in
1992, when the arm ed forces 
refused to allow its power and influ­
ence to be diminished by a new con­
stitution or by a military organic law 
proposed by opposition parties. In 
the events leading up to the May
1993 general elections, the military 
made it clear that no m atter the 
results the arm ed forces would “co- 
govern Paraguay for centuries unto 
centuries.” The threat to 
Paraguayan democracy is personi­
fied and em bodied in a populist 
general nam ed Lino Oviedo, com­
m ander of the arm ed forces.
Juan Carlos Wasmosy, a civil engi­
neer and candidate of the ruling 
Colorado party, won the May 1993 
presidential election with 40 per­
cent of the vote, making him the 
first civilian president chosen in 
free, competitive and direct elec­
tions since Paraguay’s indepen­
dence. His election has allowed 
Paraguay to finally discard its isola­
tionism, a process started by 
Rodriguez, and cease being “an 
island surrounded by land,” as many 
Paraguayans describe their land­
locked country. The press is largely 
free, the opposition is tolerated and 
active, and hum an rights are 
respected, but the shadow of the 
military, institutional corruption, 
and poverty still linger, posing seri­
ous threats to democracy.
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President Wasmosy has not been 
able to assert civilian authority over 
the military. He has not confront­
ed the military or cut back the 
endem ic corruption  and smuggling 
traditionally protected by the 
arm ed forces. General Oviedo has 
kept up his bad boy rhetoric, open­
ly defying the president and 
Congress after they passed a law 
last year prohibiting military per­
sonnel from making political state­
ments. In a speech before 
Paraguayan farmers, Oviedo said, 
“We d o n ’t know if the m an is born  
who can sew up the m ouths of the 
military.” While Oviedo has jailed  
three generals for calling him 
“schizophrenic” and “paranoid ,” he 
him self did no t receive even a rep­
rim and.
Tensions m ounted and rum ors of 
a coup spread during the second 
half of 1994. General Ramon Rosa 
Rodriguez, director of the anti-nar­
cotics secretariat, was assassinated, 
allegedly by a fellow officer. This 
brought to light the power of the 
d rug  mafia in Paraguay, believed to 
be linked to the Cali Cartel and 
protected by the arm ed forces. 
Paraguay has become an im portant 
transit po int for Bolivian cocaine 
destined to the U.S. and Europe. 
According to U.S. officials, 
one-and-a-half tons of cocaine 
moves through Paraguay every 
week.
The opposition dem anded that 
Wasmosy do m ore to weaken the 
arm ed forces which, it contended, 
were tu rn ing  Paraguay into a narco­
democracy. Wasmosy did very lit­
tle. Then, in Decem ber civil-mili­
tary tensions reached a new high, 
provoking m ore rum ors of a coup 
and presidential assassination. 
Wasmosy denied Oviedo’s request 
to transfer a general widely viewed 
as his chief rival. Eventually, the 
president and Oviedo reached a 
compromise, but the opposition 
took this opportunity to criticize 
the president for not curbing the
power o f a co rrup t and undisci­
p lined arm ed forces headed by a 
renegade general.
Some observers believe Wasmosy 
is beholden to Oviedo because the 
general helped him gain the party 
nom ination; o ther intim ate that 
Oviedo has dam aging inform ation 
on the president and is threatening 
to use it during a time of extrem e 
public sensitivity to corruption 
am ong public officials. What is 
clear is that President Wasmosy suf­
fers from a certain paralysis -  
because to govern he must main­
tain political alliances with interest 
groups whose political agendas are 
in conflict. In the end, Paraguay’s 
democracy will depend upon how 
well Wasmosy can reconcile the 
country’s anti-democratic legacy 
with popular dem ands for dem oc­
racy and accountability.
The political history o f Paraguay 
is predom inantly authoritarian in
culture and practice. W hether mili­
tary or civilian, Paraguayan govern­
m ents have been autocratic. The 
legacy and experience of the past 
does counsel a certain caution 
regarding the short-term malleabili­
ty of long-standing sociocultural 
values and political arrangem ents 
that continue to persist. It is not 
m ere inertia. Recent developments 
in Paraguay dem onstrate that the 
past keeps com ing back in the form 
of exclusionary, clientelistic intra­
party politics which encourage and 
perpetuate militarism and corrup­
tion. The centrality of the arm ed 
forces and the lack of cohesion 
am ong socioeconomic classes and 
political organizations make 
democracy in Paraguay reversible.
In short, as Paraguayan journalist 
and political analyst Esteban 
Caballero so astutely stated, “It is 
harder to deal with the past when 
the past is still living with you.” ■
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The Measure of Reform
Bruce Kelley
N
eoliberal reform  pro­
grams in Latin 
America are designed 
to increase the role 
of markets in allocat­
ing resources with 
the aim of increasing investment 
and economic efficiency. In gener­
al, m icroeconomic changes are 
directed toward improving efficien­
cy. Tariff reductions lower domestic 
prices of im ported goods, forcing 
domestic producers to operate 
more efficiently and cut production 
costs. In a similar vein, legal or 
institutional reforms that reduce 
regulation of the labor m arket give 
firms more flexibility in production 
and lower wage rates.
Macroeconomic changes, such as 
smaller governm ent deficits, prim ar­
ily affect investment and growth 
through greater price stability and 
lower interest rates. As with lower 
wages, deficit reduction has distribu­
tional consequences as higher taxes 
and government cutbacks are not 
borne equally. An additional ten­
sion within neoliberal reform  pro­
grams is that they impose immedi­
ate costs while their benefits are 
uncertain and take time to occur.
A reduced state role and distribu­
tional consequences of reform  pro­
grams engender significant domes­
tic opposition. In some countries, 
like Brazil, political opposition has 
prevented significant reforms, while 
in Venezuela it caused the reform 
program  to collapse. Success has 
often come in countries lacking for­
mal political opposition; Chile
Bruce Kelley is assistant professor of 
economics at Florida International 
University.
under Pinochet and Peru under 
Fujimori are two examples. 
Elsewhere, governments have been 
able to im plem ent these reforms if 
they dom inate the political process, 
as in Mexico, or if they are the tradi­
tional representative of populism, 
such as Menem in Argentina. 
Domestic political factors will con­
tinue to play an im portant role in 
shaping economic policy in 1995. 
Both Argentina and Peru had presi­
dential elections with incumbents 
who used economic policy to help 
win re-election. New governments 
elected last year in Mexico, Brazil 
and Venezuela must prove they can 
manage their economies as well as 
govern their countries. The task is 
even more difficult where govern­
ments must consolidate the institu­
tions of civilian rule.
C a p it a l  G l o b aliza t io n
Growing problems with in terna­
tional financial markets will also 
present challenges for the region. 
Prom pted by the collapse of the 
Mexican peso, capital flows to the 
region will fall sharply, resulting in 
several immediate effects. First, 
countries will be forced to m oderate 
their appetite for imports, which 
will reduce growth. Trade liberaliza­
tion and booming investment tied 
to economic restructuring pro­
duced a surge in imports;
Venezuelan imports nearly doubled 
between 1990 and 1992, while 
A rgentina’s imports are two-and- 
one-half times higher than three 
years ago. Future growth, however, 
will be m uch more moderate. A 
sharp change in capital flows also 
has the potential to destabilize the 
whole financial system and could 
spark widespread bank failures in
countries like Mexico and 
Argentina. The governm ent 
response of hiking interest rates to 
slow the economy and defend the 
exchange rate m ight improve the 
external situation, but it depresses 
asset values and underm ines the bal­
ance sheet of the banking system. 
The collapse of Venezuela’s banking 
system in 1994, although caused by 
different factors, indicates the long- 
lasting impact of a financial crisis.
Financial instability will also slow 
privatization in many countries that 
still have publicly owned enterpris­
es. Although privatization has 
served to eliminate a major source 
of the public sector deficit, coun­
tries will no longer have the easy 
access to the foreign funds that 
these sales generated.
B r a z il
Despite the trem endous decline 
in inflation, price stability remains 
the key to Brazil’s economic out­
look. Plan Real has cut monthly 
inflation from 50 percent in June to 
below 2 percent, helping its design­
er, Fernando H enrique Cardoso, get 
elected president in November, but 
the country still faces trem endous 
problems. Inflation remains high, 
the currency has become severely 
overvalued, the trade balance has 
fallen into deficit in recent months 
and the governm ent has yet to 
attack the economy’s structural 
problems. While movement on 
these fronts is possible, there are 
several reasons to believe things will 
not improve much in 1995.
First, inflation is unlikely to fall 
m uch m ore since the past decline 
partly reflects a fall in inertial infla­
tion following the introduction of a 
new index (URV) and a change in
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The varying costs of economic reforms
B R A Z I L
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth 0.2% -0.8% 5.0% 4.9% 2.6% 3.3%
Inflation 433% 1001% 2105% 2644% 101% 52%
Trade
Balance1 10,578 15,525 13,072 9,630 7,290 9,370
C urrent
Account1 -1,408 6,275 -637 -5,460 -14,180 -12,000
Real:US$l2 — 0.002 0.032 0.645 0.92 1.51
'Millions of US$ 
d e a r’s average
the indexation process. Further­
more, the URV is heavily influenced 
by the exchange rate so the real’s 
appreciation during the last six 
months has helped lower inflation. 
The real’s current overvaluation, 
however, suggests any adjustment 
will produce higher inflation. Most 
importantly, the current rebound in 
economic activity reduces the likeli­
hood of lower inflation unless 
Congress passes significant econom ­
ic reforms. This is unlikely to hap­
pen given Brazil’s political situation.
Although Fernando Cardoso’s 
election in the first round of ballot­
ing last October seemed to indicate 
support for his economic reform  
program, his themes of fiscal 
responsibility and privatization did 
not carry over to Congress, where 
his party remains a small minority. 
The fragm ented nature of the 
Brazilian Congress, com bined with 
the im portance of pressure groups 
and regional interests, makes it very 
difficult to build a stable coalition to 
enact these reforms. Thus, any 
wholesale change in the fiscal sys­
tem, the core issue facing Brazil, is 
not likely this year. At best, there 
will be some sales of public enter­
prises, but these will be limited by 
public opposition and the concerns 
of investors about Brazil’s economic 
future.
The immediate picture is clouded 
by the overvalued exchange rate, 
which along with tariff reductions 
have led to a flood of imports. 
Im ports in 1994 rose an estimated 
$12 billion and the trade balance 
tu rned  negative in November. The 
more inclusive current account 
recorded a $5.4 billion deficit which 
must be financed. Last year, capital 
inflows were more than sufficient to
cover this gap and international 
reserves reached $40 billion. In the 
wake of the Mexican crisis, however, 
such flows have been reduced and 
reserves have begun falling. Thus, 
at this junctu re exchange rate policy 
is critical. The governm ent’s prob­
lem is how to alter the exchange 
rate without reigniting domestic 
inflation and underm ining public 
confidence. While an overvalued 
exchange rate can help win elec­
tions, the Mexican situation has 
rem inded everyone that the capital 
inflows underlying such a policy can 
be quickly reversed when wealth 
holders anticipate a future devalua­
tion. Unfortunately, Brazil is not 
the only country in such a dilemma.
A r g e n t in a
Argentina also faces a crucial deci­
sion regarding exchange policy, 
although the economic and political 
pictures are much different than 
Brazil. Over the last four years,
President Carlos Menem and Econ­
omy Minister Domingo Cavallo have 
ended hyperinflation, eliminated the 
public sector deficit, pushed through 
constitutional reform and sold virtu­
ally all state-owned enterprises. The 
results have been impressive; eco­
nomic growth has averaged 7 per­
cent over the past four years with 
inflation falling to 3.9 percent in 
1994. A fixed exchange rate which 
controls the money supply has been 
a key com ponent in this rebound.
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A R G E N T I N A
w
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth 4.0% 8.7% 6.0% 7.5% 3.2% 5.2%
Inflation 171% 24.9% 10.6% 3.9% 4.7% 4.1%
Trade
Balance1 4,419 -1,450 -2,428 -5,860 -1,040 -2,970
Current
Account1 -670 -6,660 -7470 -11,290 -8,170 -7,160
Peso:US$l2 0.95
Millions of US$ 
’Year’s average
0.99 0.99 0.99 1.03 1.03
The problem  is that in 1994 
Argentina recorded an estimated 
trade deficit of $5.8 billion and cur­
ren t account deficit of $10 billion, 
the latter representing 6.5 percent 
of GDP. Observers have com pared 
Argentina to Mexico of last year; 
while the parallel is not exact, 
(Argentina’s inflation has been in 
line with global inflation the last two 
years), the similarity has spooked 
investors, reversing capital flows and 
causing the domestic stock market 
to plummet. The governm ent has 
four options: do nothing and watch 
the external situation deteriorate 
further; cut expenditures and raise 
taxes to slow economic growth; hike 
domestic interest rates to reduce 
output and attract capital; or deval­
ue in the hope of improving the 
trade balance.
Cavallo has repeatedly refused to 
devalue due to the im portance of 
the exchange rate in anchoring 
domestic prices and to avoid the 
turmoil caused by Mexico’s devalua­
tion. Restrictive fiscal policy is also 
unlikely given the election year and 
the fact that while the governm ent 
deficit is rising, it is only 1 percent 
of GDP. Thus, financial measures 
appear to be the governm ent’s only 
option. Recent measures seek to 
improve the external imbalance by 
further dollarizing the financial sys­
tem and increasing interest rates, 
causing growth to drop from an esti­
m ated 7.5 percent in 1994 to 3.2 
percent this year. Since the govern­
m ent has tied m onetary policy to 
the level of reserves, capital outflows 
have sparked a liquidity crisis in the 
banking system which could spread 
to a more serious financial crisis if 
the governm ent does not alter its 
tack.
These economic problems and 
lingering resentm ent over the 
inequity of the reform  process did 
not prevent M enem ’s re-election, 
but Argentina will see slower growth 
and higher inflation in 1995.
Monthly inflation has surged to
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almost 1 percent during the past 
few m onths com pared to average 
increases of 0.2 percent over the 
previous year. The government 
deficit is rising, and although 
Menem cut expenditures across the 
board in late 1994, the structural 
problems still exist and will not be 
addressed given this year’s electoral 
pressures. Since price stability 
underlies m uch of A rgentina’s cur­
ren t success, higher inflation in 
1995 -  4.7 percent com pared to 3.9 
percent in 1994 -  could jeopardize 
the economic picture.
V e n e z u e l a
Venezuela’s experience highlights 
how quickly the reform  process can 
collapse. After surging 9.7 percent 
in 1991, output fell an estimated 1 
percent in 1993 and 3.3 percent in 
1994 amid a massive banking fail­
ure, weak political leadership and 
uncertainty surrounding economic 
policy. At the same time inflation
has shot up, topping 60 percent in 
1994 with no signs of abating. With 
a weak president facing a divided 
Congress, the political situation is 
not helping matters and the bleak 
outlook has completely turned off 
foreign investors.
The Venezuelan crisis also illus­
trates the fact that under dem ocrat­
ic rule, economic reforms need to 
be politically palatable as well as 
economically consistent. After the 
initial reform  package was imple­
m ented in 1989, riots broke out, 
leaving 300 dead. While the econo­
my boom ed in 1991 and 1992, living 
standards for the poor did not 
improve, and two military revolts in 
1992 found popular backing. 
W eakened by these coup attempts, 
public protests and electoral failure 
in the m idterm  elections, Carlos 
Andres Perez resigned in 1993 amid 
charges of corruption. Elections to 
replace him in December 1993 con­
firm ed the public’s opposition to
Special Report: South America
economic reforms; Rafael Caldera 
was elected on his promises to halt 
the privatization process and reverse 
standing economic policy.
So far, Caldera’s tenure in office 
has worsened the economic crisis. 
The banking crisis and financial 
panic in 1994 have permanently 
altered investor sentim ent and eco­
nomic stability. This, coupled with 
Caldera’s nationalist rhetoric and 
inability to formulate a coherent 
economic policy, has caused private 
investment to evaporate. At the 
same time, distributional pressures 
have kept inflation above 60 per­
cent. Price and exchange controls 
can stabilize the situation in the 
short-run, but without fiscal reforms 
and reduced social tensions, sustain­
able medium-term growth will not 
appear. The banking crisis will also 
continue to depress output as the 
financial system remains extremely 
fragile. For 1995, the growing trade 
and current account surplus reflect 
ongoing problems in the domestic 
economy rather than the external 
sector’s strength.
C h il e
With the smooth transition to a 
new president, Eduardo Frei, and 
continued sensible macroeconomic 
management, Chile appears to have 
consolidated the economic and 
political reforms of the past. While 
tensions between the civilian govern­
m ent and the military continue, they 
are unlikely to derail the current 
expansion. The governm ent’s tar­
gets of average growth of 5.5 percent 
through the end of the decade and 
5 percent inflation in 1999 are opti­
mistic, but achievable. Reforms such 
as privatization of the pension sys­
tem have sparked savings and invest­
ment, while the emphasis on infra­
structure development will improve 
productivity and the competitiveness 
of Chile’s exports, the key to the 
country’s economic success.
On the other side, the govern­
m ent must indicate it is more sensi-
C H I L E
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth 6.0% 10.4% 6.0% 4.2% 5.3% 5.1%
Inflation 21.8% 51.4% 12.7% 11.4% 11.3% 10.1%
Trade
Balance1 1,574 750 -979 700 1,540 770
Current
Account1 120 -743 -2,093 -770 -60 -390
Peso:US$l2 349 363 404 420 390 400
‘Millions of US$ 
^Year’s average
V E N E Z U E L A
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth 9.7% 6.2% -1.0% -3.3% -0.2% 1.8%
Inflation 54.2% 31.4% 38.1% 60.8% 70.5% 54.0%
Trade
Balance1 4,837 1,274 2,902 7,990 9,144 8,440
C urrent
Account1 1,736 -3,753 -2,223 4,120 3,880 4,200
Bolivar:US$l2 57 68 91 149 206 266
'Millions of US$ 
d e a r’s average
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tive to social issues and the poor 
than have previous administrations. 
While aggregate output has nearly 
doubled over the last dozen years,
30 percent of the population contin­
ues to live in poverty; more atten­
tion must be given to how the eco­
nomic pie is distributed. The previ­
ous administration was able to side­
step this issue given the difficulties 
of a transition to civilian rule, but 
the new governm ent cannot. 
Increasingly, support for a particu­
lar civilian governm ent will be based 
on its ability to solve these problems 
rather than as an option to military 
rule. Candidate Frei indicated that 
social spending in health and edu­
cation would increase, but President 
Frei has no t carried through on 
these promises, and recent strikes 
indicate growing restlessness on the 
part of workers.
These factors suggest that 
increased growth in 1995 will likely 
preclude any further reduction in 
inflation. As tight m onetary policy,
which reduced inflation from 22 
percent in 1991 to 11.4 percent last 
year, is loosened, investment and 
growth should pick up from an esti­
mated 4.2 percent in 1994 to 5.3 
percent this year. The govern­
m ent’s ability to run  a m ore expan­
sionary policy, despite the risk of 
higher inflation, reflects last year’s 
decision to sacrifice growth in 
return  for price stability. This modi­
fied fears in the business com m uni­
ty that civilian rule would result in a 
return  to the short-run, populist 
policies of the past.
F u t u r e  T r e n d s  
Latin America’s economic 
rebound of the last four years will 
slow significantly in 1995 as the 
region finds it increasingly difficult 
to attract the external capital which 
has funded the recent growth.
While international capital markets 
have reduced their enthusiasm for 
em erging markets in general, specif­
ic factors in many countries also
work against continued growth. 
External imbalances in Argentina 
and Brazil require some change in 
economic policy, while banking fail­
ures in Venezuela have wiped out a 
large part of the country’s financial 
capital. Only in Chile is the combi­
nation of solid growth and reason­
able price stability forecast with a 
high degree of confidence.
Thus, 1995 will likely witness 
sharply differing economic perfor­
mances across South America as 
countries have varying degrees of 
success in addressing their specific 
combination of economic imbal­
ances, social tensions and political 
uncertainty. While a return  to the 
hyperinflation and stagnation of the 
1980s is unlikely, the promises of 
sustained growth with price stability 
made by neoliberal reform ers will 
remain elusive. Instead the region 
will exhibit great promise, bu t also 
great volatility, as countries grope 
with developing and applying their 
own set of consistent reforms. ■
'Americas 
Net
The Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University, in 
cooperation with Tandem Computer Corporation, presents AmericasNet, an 
Internet site that serves as the centralized source of information on progress 
toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
On AmericasNet you w ill find:
• A complete repository of documents from the 1994 Summit of the Americas
• Overviews of current hemispheric trade agreements
• Detailed economic analyses on the countries and sub-regions of the Americas
Coming soon:
• Full text and analysis of CBI, ATPAand other trade agreements in the Americas
• Status of negotiations regarding Chile's accession to NAFTA
To connect to AmericasNet, point your World-Wide-Web browser to http://americas.fiu.edu. For more information, 
you can e-mail webmaster@americas.fiu.edu or call Rene Ramos at (305) 348-2894/Fax (305) 348-3593.
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F A X
Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Andean Cicciolina
Susana Diaz, a form er cabaret 
dancer also known as “la Cicciolina 
Chola,” won a seat in the Peruvian 
Congress during the April general 
elections. Diaz, who campaigned 
by displaying her ballot num ber 
(13) on her derriere, has been fac­
ing some difficulties in her new job. 
In late May she was charged with 
associating with “el Vaticano,”
P eru ’s most notorious drug lord 
who was arrested in 1994. 
Apparently, Diaz was one of many 
perform ers h ired  to entertain  traf­
fickers during their hours of bore­
dom  in the Huallaga Valley.
New Cuba Man
Richard Nuccio, deputy undersecre­
tary of state for Latin American 
Affairs, has been nam ed President 
C linton’s special adviser on Cuban 
Affairs. Nuccio’s views on Cuba are 
well liked in Miami’s exile com m u­
nity, which viewed the appointm ent 
as an attem pt to tem per the adm in­
istration’s new policy of repatriating 
Cubans fleeing the island.
New Report Out
In January  1995, the Inter- 
American Development Bank and 
the Economic Commission for 
Latin America issued “Trade 
Liberalization in the Western 
H em isphere.” The repo rt summa­
rizes the findings of governm ent 
officials, entrepreneurs and acade­
mics on three issues: what m ight be
Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra 
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achieved from hem ispheric trade 
liberalization; essential conditions 
to maximize gains; and how to go 
about liberalizing trade. The pro­
ject concluded that trade liberaliza­
tion by itself is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of the develop­
m ent process; that countries 
require access to better trade data 
in order to proceed with hem i­
spheric liberalization; and that lib­
eralization warrants caution.
Copies of the report can be 
obtained from the IDB or ECLAC.
Miami Bound
Over the last year, Miami, San Juan, 
Tampa and several o ther cities com­
peted to attract the United States 
Southern Command, the U.S. mili­
tary’s headquarters for operations 
in Central and South America. In 
March, the Pentagon announced 
that SOUTHCOM would move to 
Miami in 1999. Miami expects to 
gain about 750 jobs and increased 
com m erce as a result of the move.
Florida’s Summit Fever
In June 1995, Florida Governor 
Lawton Chiles signed a budget bill 
authorizing the establishm ent of 
the Summit of the Americas Center. 
Launched in August 1995, the 
Center will m onitor progress on the 
accords signed by the Summit par­
ticipants in Decem ber of 1994. 
Housed at Florida International 
University’s Latin American and 
Caribbean Center, the Center is a 
cooperative venture am ong FIU, 
the University of Florida’s Center 
for Latin American Studies, and the 
University of Miami’s North-South 
Center.
Beauty and the Beast
During a recent visit to London, 
Argentine Foreign Minister Guido 
di Telia was quoted complaining 
about the immigration woes of his 
country. At curren t growth rates, 
between 25 and 30 percent of 
A rgentina’s population could be of 
Bolivian or Paraguayan origin by 
the year 2000. Di Telia told the 
British audience that his country 
wants to be close to the “beautiful 
people.” Argentina, like the U.S. 
and several European countries, is 
facing an anti-immigrant fervor 
am ong its population that could 
possibly translate into governm ent 
policy.
The Hand o f God
Soundly defeated 3-0 by the U.S., 
the Argentine soccer team had 
som ething to prove in its final game 
at the Copa America played in 
Uruguay last July. A rgentina scored 
early and led for most of the ball 
game against world cham pion 
Brazil. Then, in the last few m in­
utes, Brazil’s Tulio downed the ball 
with his hand and scored, tying the 
score and sending the game into 
an overtime penalty shortout. Ar­
gentina lost in penalty kicks and 
was elim inated from the com peti­
tion; calls went out for the head of 
the referee who had failed to call 
the hand ball. The irony was not 
lost on Brazilians, who invoked 
M aradona’s “hand of G od” goal 
against Great Britain in the 1986 
World Cup. M aradona, however, 
was incensed by the comparison, 
calling Tulio’s effort “the devil’s 
hand .”
F L E
111 Will Ambassador
Brazilian President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s scheduled July 
visit to Portugal met with some 
unusual problems. The Brazilian 
ambassador to Lisbon is Cardoso’s 
predecessor, Itam ar Franco. On July 
18, 1995, Reuters reported  state­
m ents by the ambassador that 
Cardoso’s policies would damage 
the economy and hu rt salaried 
workers. Franco went on to warn 
that high interest rates would trig­
ger a recession and that were it not 
for his help, Cardoso would never 
have become president. Cardoso 
responded that “in the future all 
form er presidents should be nam ed 
ambassadors to Lisbon.”
Fidel Castro On-Line
Net heads have produced a series of 
innovative, unusual, and often 
hum orous new sites on the World 
Wide Web. O ne of the most recent 
to surface is the “Fidel for 
President” page. Any surfer can tap 
in to a photo gallery of Fidel, order 
t-shirts and bum per stickers, read 
about vice-presidential possibilities, 
and write to complain or comment. 
To reach the Fidel hom e page 
through the World Wide Web type 
http://www .slugs.com /im age- 
sm ith/fidel.
Transparent Time
Transparency In ternational’s March 
newsletter reports that Colombian 
President Ernesto Samper launched 
a m ajor anti-corruption campaign 
to restore public confidence in that 
country’s public sector. The plan 
calls for the establishm ent of a
“transparency office” in each 
agency to interact with the public, 
and a “transparent m inute” on 
radio and television to provide 
updates on the progress of the 
plan.
Exporting Pension Plans
According to an item in the May 4 
issue of the Latin American Weekly 
Report, the Chilean pension fund 
adm inistrator signed agreem ents in 
principle with the governments of 
Bolivia and El Salvador to begin 
operations in those countries when 
private pension schemes are intro­
duced there. Provida is one of the 
best known private pension 
investors in Latin America, having 
invested in Argentina, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru. The move is 
another step toward the disman­
tling of publicly-funded pension 
plans throughout the region.
Blinders in Bolivia
According to Americas Watch, an 
official with the DEA adm itted that 
to avoid direct knowledge of abuses 
by Bolivian police, DEA agents 
“wear blinders when conducting 
jo in t operations.” One agent was 
quoted as saying, “we are guests in 
their country. It’s not for us to crit­
icize...we fuel the truck and say, ‘go 
get 'em .’ If people come back 
arrested with bruises on their face, 
it’s not my responsibility.”
AT&T Reaches Out
Cresencio Arcos, form er ambas­
sador to H onduras and until May, 
deputy assistant secretary of state 
for Narcotics and Terrorism
Matters, has accepted a position as 
vice president of International 
Public Relations with AT&T. Arcos 
will work out of AT&T’s Latin 
American headquarters in Coral 
Gables, Florida.
Requiem for the Left
In May, some 250 Latin American 
leftists regrouped in Montevideo, 
Uruguay to protest the em bargo 
against Cuba, to call for a renegoti­
ation of the region’s foreign debt, 
respect for hum an rights, and for 
social justice. According to press 
accounts of the meeting, the partic­
ipants spent most of the time purg­
ing those leftist parties who have 
em braced m arket reforms and very 
little time on how to reverse the 
organized left’s electoral irrele­
vance in the curren t neoliberal 
trend. Remarked a young 
Uruguayan, “It’s no good clinging 
to old symbols. If we d o n ’t wake 
up, the left will be swallowed by the 
right.”
Ideology o f Terror
Amnesty In ternational’s annual 
report claims 4,000 political prison­
ers in Peruvian jails; the majority 
are members of the Shining Path. 
According to Luis Gonzales, an AI 
officer in Peru, “crimes by terro r­
ists, even when they are of a crimi­
nal nature, are considered political 
because they have a political m oti­
vation.” Fujimori responded, “some 
believe that when a terrorist says he 
has an ideology, he should no 
longer be considered a terrorist.” 
Most Peruvian hum an rights organi­
zations reject AI’s conclusions as 
well.
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The Money Store
Jeremy Adelman
T
his essay puts the tur­
moil of Latin American 
financial markets into a 
recent historical per­
spective. It has two 
interrelated arguments: 
first, the reactions to the debt crisis 
of 1982 spawned a set of policies 
designed to revamp Latin American 
economies without eliminating the 
underlying dependence on world 
money markets; second, recent 
(post-1990) capital flows and the 
euphoria of “em erging markets” 
obscured the highly contingent and 
volatile nature of transborder invest­
ment.
These two arguments are related. 
The policies to cope with financial 
upheaval of the 1980s generated 
opportunities for new, highly specu­
lative investment in Latin America. 
This dovetailed with slumping yields 
on financial investments in core 
money markets and a slowdown in 
general economic perform ance, 
which released mobile capital to 
pursue higher earnings abroad. In 
large measure, the recent malaise in 
Mexico can be attributed to the 
com bination of a closure in specula­
tive financial deals and the repatria­
tion of capital to core markets as 
economic growth has recovered and 
interest rates rise.
We are not, however, witnesses to 
the reenactm ent of the previous 
debt crisis. The meltdown of the
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Mexican peso and its fallout is his­
torically unique. Comparisons with 
previous crises help illustrate the 
multiple personalities of finance 
capital and the challenges public 
authorities will face in trying to 
avert a full-scale global financial cri­
sis. As Walter Bagehot warned in 
his classic Jeremiad on the eve of the 
first great depression in 1875, finan­
cial crises can rock the balance 
between the pursuit of private self- 
interest and the effectiveness of 
public regulation.
Financial crises can rock the 
balance between the pursuit 
of private self-interest and 
the effectiveness of public 
regulation.
1982 in  R e t r o s p e c t
In August 1982, when Mexican 
Finance Minister Jesus Silva Herzog 
announced Mexico’s inability to 
m eet future debt payments, a five- 
year boom in lending to Latin 
America came to a sharp and cata­
clysmic end. Several aspects of for­
eign borrowing deserve m ention.
First, m uch o f the money was 
used throughout the region (with 
the arguable exception of Brazil) to 
correct underlying deficits on trade 
accounts. In the late 1970s, 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and 
Venezuela used foreign exchange 
rates as blunt instrum ents to tackle 
domestic inflation. Over the medi­
um-term, local currencies soon 
became overvalued, drawing greater 
imports and inhibiting exports. In
some countries, such as Argentina 
and Chile, military regimes 
em barked on a reckless campaign to 
deregulate local financial sectors, 
enabling billowing local banks to act 
as interm ediaries for the deluge of 
foreign funds. The accumulation of 
external debt responded to domes­
tic policies designed to stabilize and 
“liberalize” Latin American 
economies.
Second, capital flowed almost 
exclusively through the sinews of 
commercial banks, based mainly in 
the U nited States. Until the late 
1950s, commercial banks played a 
residual role in dispensing global 
capital, and much of the non-equity 
flows moved through official chan­
nels (such as the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development 
Bank). In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, com bined with inno­
vations in international bank lend­
ing practices (primarily the inven­
tion of the syndicated loan), loos­
ened banks from their national 
moorings and converted them  into 
potential channels for investible 
funds. Thus, when world oil prices 
began to soar in the 1970s, OPEC 
surpluses were recirculated into off­
shore banks who found themselves 
with a surfeit of capital to lend. In 
the context of a generalized crisis in 
the OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development), lending to develop­
ing countries became increasingly 
attractive.
These pull and push factors in 
global capital markets triggered 
unprecedented  flows from money 
centers to Latin America. Policy 
changes, especially in the rules gov­
erning local financial affairs, eased
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the access to local markets, while 
large quasi-oligopolistic commercial 
banks served as the main agent for 
capital flows to the region. When 
the crisis hit in 1982, most 
economies reacted by reversing ear­
lier liberalization measures. In 
turn, Latin American countries 
lined up to renegotiate their debts 
to banks, and for the first five years 
of the adjustm ent phase foreign 
endebtedness actually rose as banks 
rolled over previous obligations. A 
crucial actor in this complicated 
brokerage was the International 
M onetary Fund (IMF), which sud­
denly donned unprecedented insti­
tutional strength as m ediator and 
lender of last resort. In this fashion, 
a combination o f policy flexibility, 
bank rollovers and strategic interna­
tional institutional intervention 
avoided full-scale default.
Com pared to previous financial 
crises in Latin America, such as the 
1820s, the 1890s or the 1930s, m an­
agem ent in the 1980s averted finan­
cial collapse. The institutional 
structure of 1970s lending made 
commercial banks the final holders 
of most of the semi-periphery’s 
debt. Moreover, banks’ syndicated 
lending practices allowed them  to 
stand as a common front -  in con­
trast to the atomized and disorga­
nized profile of bondholders in ear­
lier financial cycles. In previous 
crises, sovereign borrowers could 
more easily default or force lenders 
to accept more generous terms to 
reschedule debts since most 
investors did not have the institu­
tional clout of money-center banks.
Together, these institutional 
changes shifted the bargaining 
power between lender and borrow­
er dramatically in favor of the for­
mer. This power enabled banks to 
divert substantial resources out of 
the periphery to the core. 
Paradoxically, while old debts were 
rolled over and interest arrears fold­
ed into the accumulated principal, 
Latin America endured sustained 
net outflows of resources (debt-ser- 
vice charges over new earnings of 
foreign exchange) for the rest of 
the 1980s.
The very heterogeneity 
of money managers and 
skittishness of petty 
investors inhibits any 
cooperation.
T h e  S e c o n d  A d ju s t m e n t
The first phase of adjustm ent 
soon ran afoul. The initial response 
to the crisis sought to protect the 
stability of the world financial sys­
tem at the expense of debtors. By 
1987, however, debtors had suffered 
five years of financial compression 
and clearly displayed signs of debt 
fatigue: m ounting social tension, 
careening inflation and widening 
budget deficits, the latter two aggra­
vated and no t am eliorated by IMF 
stabilization.
Latin America faced a second 
round of adjustment. Sponsored by 
the U nited States Treasury 
Departm ent, an alternative system 
of debt restructuring sought to 
reduce the overall weight of out­
standing debt. International institu­
tions as well as U.S. Treasury bonds 
were used to support debt buyback 
(whereby Central Banks would pur­
chase the debt from creditors at 
some discount) and conversion 
from bank debt to longer-term port­
folio debt (the so-called Brady 
Bonds). Beginning in 1987 with 
Chile, but more generalized under 
the um brella of the “Brady Plan” in 
1989, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, Uruguay and Argentina began 
offering debt and debt service 
reduction options. By 1993, some 
$116 billion had been altered from 
short-term to longer-term debt or 
changed to domestic obligations 
through buyback provisions.
This second phase of debt adjust­
m ent had its domestic corollary. In 
chronically high inflation countries 
like Argentina and Brazil, inflation 
was attacked with dramatic austerity. 
In countries with “controlled insta­
bility,” like Venezuela, the macro- 
economic situation persisted with 
simmering inflation and large pub­
lic sector deficits (in this case abet­
ted by an anemic oil industry). 
Several aborted coups d ’etat in 1992 
only betrayed the weakness of the 
civilian regime. In moderately infla­
tionary countries like Mexico, stabi­
lization was more effective. Either 
way, most Latin American countries 
em barked on stiff anti-inflationary 
campaigns.
But the big policy shift came with 
the massive privatization of state 
firms across the region. There is a 
crucial link between debt manage­
m ent and selling public assets. 
Debtors aimed to line treasury cof­
fers (thereby closing the fiscal gap) 
and restock central bank reserves 
(and thereby giving governments 
desperately needed foreign 
exchange). Furtherm ore, debt- 
equity swapping (the exchange of 
shares in form er public enterprises
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Chart I: Distribution o f Capital Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean
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in return  for old foreign d eb t), a 
preferred  means to finance privati­
zation, allowed Latin American gov­
ernm ents to slash the overall princi­
pal.
These policy moves coincided 
with structural changes in world 
capital. First, at the behest of the 
U.S. and British governments, finan­
cial markets were substantially liber­
alized. Barriers to entry of new 
investors and money managers 
dropped while restrictions on the 
range of financial institutions’ activi­
ties were removed. Walls between 
banking, securities, trust and insur­
ance companies quickly disap­
peared, creating a wide diversity of 
money managers. The old world of 
commercial bank authority over 
money centers began to collapse as 
it was exposed to intense competi­
tion.
Second, governments in money 
centers slashed transaction costs on 
international nonbank capital flows. 
In the U.S., for instance, “Regula­
tion S” enabled developing coun­
tries’ securities to be issued in U.S. 
capital markets without paying steep 
registration fees. Rule 144A relaxed 
stipulations that securities buyers 
hold their investment for at least 
two years, thereby increasing the 
liquidity of their holdings. Both 
reforms were passed in 1990. Japan 
and Switzerland followed with simi­
lar measures.
Chart I is a graphic representa­
tion of proportional distribution of 
lending in Latin America. Whereas 
commercial banks were the over­
whelming source of external 
finance to Latin America in 1982, 
their business was drastically 
reduced a decade later. In turn, for­
eign direct investment (FDI -  out­
right offshore ownership of assets 
within Latin Am erica), rose -  this, 
in contrast to the global decline in 
FDI. FDI has now become the 
largest single source of external 
funding to developing countries, 
m uch of it linked to privatization.
Most remarkable was the coterie of 
new private interm ediaries in port­
folio equity and bond markets.
From 1990 to 1993, private capital 
flows from lenders to the develop­
ing world rose by 250 percent. Most 
of it was concentrated in middle- 
income countries. In 1993 alone, 
total debt stock of developing coun­
tries rose by $90 billion. Some of 
this reflected reconversion of old 
debts. For instance, the capitaliza­
tion of interest (folding accumulat­
ed interest arrears into the principal 
of the loan while rescheduling its 
maturity and new interest rate) 
alone raised Third World debt 
stocks by $15 billion in 1993 (and it 
is estimated that another $10 billion 
in interest arrears remain outstand­
ing) . Debt stocks nonetheless 
remain high and are rising. By 
1994, total disbursements of debts 
in Latin America were significantly 
higher than they were in 1982, in 
some countries by as m uch as 50 
percent.
Changing rules in world capital 
markets increased the range and 
flexibility of financial instrum ents 
and perm itted Latin American bor­
rowers to broaden the spectrum of
capital sources. But as early as 1991, 
the IMF itself warned that this 
emerging system would pose new 
difficulties for financial supervision.
T h e  C u r r e n t  C r is is
Much o f the recent profile of 
lending and borrowing activity 
resembles earlier patterns of capital 
flows. Prior to the 1970s, Latin 
America’s private sector was the 
largest destination for external 
funds, and, more importantly, capi­
tal flowed through an array of non­
bank channels. Borrowing and 
lending transpired through an 
atomized and relatively uninvigilat­
ed system. It would seem that, with 
the demise of the commercial 
banks, we have re tu rned  to earlier 
forms on nonequity capital flows. 
This has im portant implications for 
debt management.
There is a further historical paral­
lel. Just as capital flowed to Latin 
America during the OECD slump of 
the 1970s, and flowed out with the 
North Atlantic recovery of the mid- 
1980s, the remigration of capital to 
big Latin American borrowers was 
contingent upon a downturn in the 
OECD beginning in 1989. The
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inveterate pursuit of higher returns, 
even at the cost of higher risk, led 
investors to booming offshore cen­
ters in the so-called em erging mar­
kets (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Mexico City and Buenos Aires being 
am ong the most lucrative -  at least 
until 1994). The recent economic 
recovery in the North Atlantic and, 
since early 1994, rising interest rates 
have prom pted, once again, capital 
remigration to the core. This was 
one of the underlying causes of 
Mexico’s recent troubles.
The o ther cause, just as in the 
1880s and 1920s, was the role of 
capital flows to correct current 
account imbalances. Across the 
region a combination of low domes­
tic savings, overvalued exchange 
rates and reluctance to sterilize the 
effects of massive capital inflows 
prom oted yawning trade deficits. 
Mexico’s deficit, by far the Third 
W orld’s most outstanding, is estimat­
ed to have topped $30 billion in 
1994, followed by China then 
Argentina. Sustainable as long as 
net capital flows favored debtors, 
the imbalance was thrown into sud­
den relief once money began flow­
ing in the opposite direction. The 
result was that Mexican Central 
Bankers quickly ran down their 
reserves in an effort to defend the 
peso (largely to see the ruling PRI 
through the elections).
Once again, the confluence of 
domestic policy decisions and inter­
national economic cycles com bined 
to direct capital flows, first into and 
then out of debtor countries. This 
conjuncture, however, differs from 
its predecessor of the early 1980s.
What has changed is the personal­
ity of finance capital. The domi­
nant actors resemble m uch more 
the profile prior to the 1960s, of 
heterogeneous and relatively atom­
ized lenders to an equally disparate 
array of borrowers. What made the 
first and second phases of the 1980s 
adjustm ent work was the facility to 
overcome coordination problems.
Debts could be renegotiated am ong 
a small coterie of large banks 
engaged with sovereign debtors.
Now, however, borrowers come 
largely from the private sector and 
cannot easily displace their insol­
vency on to taxpayers or consumers, 
as Latin American governments did 
in the 1980s. Mexico’s giant con­
glomerates, G rupo Sidek and 
Grupo Financiero Banamex, are on 
the verge of financial collapse and 
threaten to eviscerate the country’s 
financial structure. Similar firms in 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela are 
teetering.
Likewise, on the creditor side, the 
form ation of coherent blocs is prov­
ing impossible. President C linton’s 
desperate effort to cobble together 
loan guarantees was designed to 
shore up investor confidence and
prevent a stam pede out of Mexican 
securities. The very heterogeneity 
of money managers and skittishness 
of petty investors inhibits any coop­
eration. The result is -  rather than 
rollover debts as in the 1980s -  
volatile financiers are calling in 
their loans to Latin America.
The com bination of institutional 
atomization of financial actors and 
the great volatility of capital flows 
makes this debt crisis both very dif­
ferent and extremely dangerous. 
After a decade of deregulating of 
global finance, it remains to be seen 
whether central bankers and inter­
national m onetary authorities have 
the instrum ents to cope with actors 
they themselves helped create. If 
not, we may be facing circum­
stances m ore analogous to 1929 
than 1982. ■
ler
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Waiting for the Promised Land
Victor Uribe
grarian reform is a 
Latin American fixa­
tion. Ecologists, peas­
ants, guerrillas, and 
Indians challenge 
landowners, ranchers, 
gold hunters, and government -  all 
in the name of land. So what hap­
pened to agrarian reform? What 
became of the many attempts to 
modify the structure of land tenure 
in Latin America? What is the future 
of agrarian reform across the region? 
Four cases indicative of distinct 
approaches and different epochs in 
the development of agrarian reform 
under non-socialist regimes will pro­
vide some answers.
M e x ic o
Thanks to revolutionary mobiliza­
tion and progressive populist govern­
m ent coalitions, extensive agrarian 
reforms were carried out in Mexico 
for decades, especially in the 1930s. 
From the Mexican Revolution until 
the early 1990s, millions of hectares 
of land were transferred to ejidos or 
communal farms. By 1991, 43 per­
cent of all farmland and 60 percent 
of the farmers (3 million families) 
were organized into ejidos, of which 
there are currently about 22,000.
Alongside the collective ejidos, 
there are numerous small private 
farms. Today about 50 percent of 
Mexico’s farmland is privately owned 
and some 15 percent of it is in 
parcels of five hectares of less. A 
good part of the rem ainder is made 
up of other “small property;” ceilings 
limiting the am ount of privately 
owned land were established in 1971.
Victor Uribe is assistant professor of his­
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However, peasant families have not 
generally escaped poverty. Part of 
the land distributed to them was of 
inferior quality, and extension ser­
vices have been inadequate. Many 
landless families must supplement 
their income through other revenue- 
generating activities (handicraft pro­
duction being a key one) on a micro­
scale. Proprietors of m odern com­
mercial farms (over 100 hectares), 
particularly in the north and north­
west of the country, generally pro­
duce crops for export and have 
enjoyed better fortunes. They have 
benefited from policies aimed at 
agrarian modernization, especially 
irrigation districts, subsidized credit 
and technological assistance.
The Mexican government recently 
resolved to put a stop to agrarian 
reform and even enacted measures 
aimed at reversing some standing 
legislation. As part of the neoliberal 
reforms intended to modernize 
Mexico’s economy, a 1992 constitu­
tional am endm ent ended land distri­
bution and introduced mechanisms 
that made it possible for both local 
and foreign corporations to hold 
and work rural lands. The amend­
m ent also allows ejido lands to be 
leased or sold at supervised prices.
The end of land distribution in 
Mexico has come at a mom ent of 
increasing rural unrest, particularly 
in Chiapas, where at least one-third 
of the 1.5 million local Indians have 
no land. In fact, Mexican authorities 
estimate that in the year following 
the Zapatista National Liberation 
Army’s 1994 revolt, the region’s land­
less were responsible for about 2,000 
seizures of private cattle ranches and 
coffee lands. Although some land 
may be redistributed in Chiapas for 
the sake of political expediency, the
government’s neoliberal economic 
programs preclude further land dis­
tribution in the rest of the country 
and aim instead at “m odernizing” 
agriculture by increasing its commer­
cial dimension. Agriculture’s mod­
ernization and commercialization 
will likely lead to land concentration.
C o l o m b ia
The first true “agrarian social 
reform law” was enacted in 1961 
after a long bargaining process 
between Liberals and Conservatives, 
thus anticipating a wave of Alliance 
for Progress-sponsored reforms that 
came into vogue during the 1960s. 
Policies were not a response to for­
eign pressure but to the urgent need 
to restore peace and legitimacy after 
the protracted civil war that engulfed 
the country from 1948 until the 
1960s. Some major haciendas and 
regions of significant latifundia were 
targeted. The government also 
sponsored peasant associations as a 
way of underm ining opposition from 
landowners.
Direct participation of peasants in 
the implementation of the reform 
and the delivery of agricultural ser­
vices led to the radicalization of the 
peasant groups and produced waves 
of land invasions during the early 
1970s. The num ber of redistributed 
hectares more than tripled from the 
1960s to the 1970s. Estimates indi­
cate that some 66,000 families gained 
access to approximately 1.2 million 
hectares as a direct result of the land 
struggles of the 1970s. Another
100,000 families received nearly 1.8 
million hectares under less con­
tentious circumstances.
The pace of land redistribution 
slowed in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, and different governments
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used agrarian legislation to push 
large-scale landholders into m odern­
izing their haciendas. In the mid- 
1980s, agrarian reform surfaced 
again during peace talks between the 
government and rebels. A proposal 
intended to streamline land transfer 
was drafted by a commission of 
experts. New legislation was 
approved in 1985 after a long bar­
gaining process that watered down 
the original proposal’s progressive 
provisions.
Agrarian issues were revived in
1989 when an “agrarian jurisdiction” 
was created to resolve conflicts over 
rural lands, formerly adjudicated in 
the overcrowded civil courts. Under 
recent legislation, some formal land 
allocation by the government has 
occurred. The main beneficiaries 
have been Indian communities, but 
extensive de facto colonization of 
public lands continues to take place 
as landless peasants migrate to fron­
tier regions and rainforest areas. 
Moreover, in the early 1990s, a new 
constitution reiterated the “social 
function” of agrarian property and 
provided legal mechanisms (tutelas 
or injunctive actions) to redress land 
claims by peasants and Indians. 
Though these and other pressures 
on the part of civilians or armed 
rebels may lead to some land distrib­
ution, the efforts of the current 
Liberal government are geared 
towards privatizing public companies 
and making labor legislation “flexi­
ble.” Land distribution is not at the 
top of the government’s economic 
agenda.
E l  Sa lv a d o r
A significant agrarian reform was 
instituted in El Salvador in 1980 by a 
civilian-military ju n ta  which had
taken power the year before. The 
jun ta  decided that agrarian transfor­
mation would contribute to econom­
ic development and, more impor­
tantly, was necessary to avert a full- 
scale civil war.
The reform was scheduled in three 
phases. Phase I consisted of the 
expropriation of estates over 500 
hectares for conversion into peasant 
production cooperatives. Phase II 
would have expropriated estates of 
100-150 (depending on the soil qual­
ity) to 500 hectares. Phase III gave 
individual titles to those who worked 
land under tenancy agreements. In 
Phase I, more than 30,000 families 
benefited from the expropriation of 
nearly 220,000 hectares, 12 percent 
of it coffee land.
The political climate did not allow 
implementation of Phase II; but 
much later, Phase III was pushed 
through amid great difficulty, bene­
fiting more than 95,000 families who 
received about 97,000 hectares. As a 
whole, though, there were about
155,000 fewer beneficiary families 
and about 425,000 fewer hectares 
than originally envisioned. The 
entire reform affected nearly 20 per­
cent of the country’s land and one- 
quarter of the rural population, yet 
left unsolved the landless situation of 
a large num ber of peasants.
Peace talks in the early 1990s 
included promises of land for both 
former insurgents and discharged 
members of the military. These land 
grants were to have come from vol­
untary sales by private owners to a 
Land Bank or from membership in 
standing agrarian cooperatives. The 
magnitude of the distribution actual­
ly carried out under such agree­
ments is unknown, but in the early 
months of 1995 there were num er­
ous street clashes and seizures of gov­
ernm ent buildings by individuals 
(particularly former members of the 
army) who dem anded compliance 
with the peace accords, especially 
provisions concerning the distribu­
tion of land. Like the rest of Latin 
America, the government of El 
Salvador is privatizing, and anything 
other than the minimum land 
required to solve immediate political 
crises is unlikely.
B r a zil
Agrarian legislation was first enact­
ed in 1964 under a military govern­
ment, but changes to the structure of 
land tenure were not significant. By 
the mid-1980s, official data indicated 
that 70 percent of farmland in Brazil 
was made up of latifundia (estates 
over 1,200 hectares) and only 8 per­
cent was made up of family farms. 
Furtherm ore, the 2 percent of rural 
properties with more than 1,000 
hectares occupied 57 percent of the 
agricultural land in 1985. Thirty per­
cent of farms smaller than ten 
hectares accounted for only 1 per­
cent of farmland. Finally, during 
1974-1984, holdings of less than 10 
hectares saw their share of farmland 
fall from 1.2 to 1.0 percent, whereas 
the area occupied by estates with 
more than 1,000 hectares rose from 
48 to 57 percent. This all suggests a 
continuing pattern of land concen­
tration and inequity.
Rural violence paralleled land con­
centration, particularly during the 
1980s. Evictions, land-grabbing, 
estate occupations, and peasant resis­
tance escalated. Thousands of rural 
farmers have been assassinated. The 
huge flow of internal landless immi­
grants flocking towards the new fron­
tiers in Amazonia (Acre, Amazonas,
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Summary Table: Agrarian Reform in Four Latin American Countries
Country Main Reform 
Period
# Hectares 
Distributed
#Families
Benefitted
Gini
Coeff.
Mexico *1917-1990 93,000,000 3,000,000
Colombia 1962-1979 5,856,900+ 253,4150 .70
El Salvador 1980s 315,132 79,436
Brazil* 1964-1989 4,200,000 81,0000 .86
Sources: William C. Thiesenhusen ed.. Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America (Boston: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989); Roy L. Prosterman, Mary N. Temple and Timothy M. Hanstad eds., 
Agrarian Reform and Grass Roots Development. Ten Case Studies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990) ; 
Susan R. Walsh Sanderson, Land Reform in Mexico: 1910-1980 (Orlando: Academic Press, 
1984); Leon Zaxnosc, The Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movement in Colombia. Struggles of 
the National Peasant Association. 1967-1981 (New York: Cambridge, 1986); U nited Nations 
Development Program, Hum an Development Report (New York, 1993).
* approximate figures
tcom bines land redistribution and allocation o f titles o f public land
Rondonia, Roraima) has also acceler­
ated environmental destruction. 
Following a long period of military 
rule, a new civilian government pro­
posed agrarian legislation in 1985. 
U nder pressure from the Uniao 
Democratica Ruralista (UDR), a pow­
erful landowners group organized to 
neutralize the new agrarian mea­
sures, the legislation rendered many 
properties (i.e., rural enterprises, 
small family farms, “productive” 
farms regardless of size) ineligible 
for expropriation. New laws enacted 
in 1987 (by which time UDR had 150 
branches throughout Brazil and 
nearly 230,000 members) added fur­
ther restrictions, limiting the am ount 
to be expropriated to 75 percent of 
an estate’s extension and mandating 
that landowners be compensated 
with financially attractive debt bonds. 
After further pressures from the 
landowners lobby, Brazil’s new 1988 
constitution also included relatively 
vague and weak provisions concern­
ing the expropriation of agrarian 
properties not “fulfilling their social 
purpose.”
In spite of the many delays and 
limitations, by the early 1990s mil­
lions of hectares and thousands of 
families had been affected by the 
new agrarian reform laws of Brazil 
(see table). Numerous latifundia 
occupied by peasant farmers and 
rainforest areas claimed by Indian 
communities were especially targeted 
for redistribution. The scale of 
agrarian problems in Brazil is gigan­
tic and far from disappearing, but 
the government has done more 
about land issues in the last decade 
than ever before. Furthermore, 
because of the dynamic nature of 
peasant organization, mobilization 
and pressure, it is likely that agrarian 
reform will continue to advance in 
Brazil. Cardoso’s government is 
committed to deepening neoliberal 
reforms in Brazil, but it also seems 
committed to addressing social 
needs, land being a critical one. 
Recently, it announced the distribu­
tion of 110 fazendas in the states of 
Para, Maranhao, and Parana among
20,000 landless families. While 
expropriating two large haciendas in 
the northern  state of Ceara in late 
March, the government also 
announced that, by 1998, 280,000 
more families will receive 11 million 
hectares of land.
W a it in g  f o r  t h e  P r o m is e d  L a n d
In Latin America, land reform has 
been a response to revolutionary or 
pre-revolutionary situations, rural 
violence, and foreign pressures -  that 
is, a political expedient. Even where 
there has been extensive land reform 
(i.e., Mexico), conflict lingers.
There continues to be the sense that 
the system of land tenure is disadvan­
tageous to a large segment of the 
population. Rural poverty still stems 
to a large extent from inequitable 
distribution of farmland.
In spite of continuing tensions in 
the countryside, every case, except 
perhaps Brazil’s (and the case of 
Guatemala, not examined here), also 
suggests that, unless specific and iso­
lated political crises dictate the distri­
bution of some land to calm particu­
larly belligerent social groups, across- 
the-board land reform policy is a 
thing of the past. Today the trend is 
to favor modernization over land 
redistribution, which Alain de Janvry 
had nam ed as one of the key obsta­
cles to democratization of land own­
ership in Latin America.
Neoliberalism, which assumes that 
economies of scale and high rates of 
capitalization are required to maxi­
mize agrarian productivity, will rein­
force the modernization option. It 
will dem and support for agribusi­
ness, agrarian corporations, efficient 
commercial agriculture and so forth, 
and will look with suspicion at any 
state attem pt to invest public funds 
in subsistence farms, indemnification 
of expropriated landowners and 
social programs in the countryside. 
Yet, as the neoliberal model starts to 
unravel, and m ounting social ten­
sions become unmanageable, it is 
likely that new coalitions will emerge 
to push forward agrarian reform 
once more. Until then, many Latin 
Americans will have to continue wait­
ing for the promised land. ■
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Out of Many, One Yard
Bruce Loshusan
Herbert, Worker in the Broum Sugar Room, Kingston, 1992
Jamaican-born Bruce Loshusan is a freelance photographer based out of New York City. His series on Jamaica was shown this Spring at FIU. 
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R E V I E W  F O R U M  
Landscape of a Revolution
Damian Fernandez
The Cuban Revolution:
Origins, Course, and Legacy
By Marifeli Perez-Stable;New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993, 236 pp.
I
f  Marifeli Perez-Stable were a 
painter, she would have been 
an impressionist. The ability 
to paint the nuances of the lit­
tle pictures that form the big 
picture is the hallmark of her 
book The Cuban Revolution: Origins, 
Course, and Legacy. This is a book of 
connections and missed connec­
tions, of what has been and what 
could have been, a masterpiece of 
scholarship.
The first missed connection the 
author attempts to address is 
between the study of Cuba and the 
study of other countries in Latin 
America. Why has Cuba been 
neglected in many landmark studies 
on the region’s politics and econom­
ics? Why have scholars presumed 
the island’s exceptional nature, 
instead of testing it? Why have theo­
retical debates largely excluded the 
Cuban case? Perez-Stable successful­
ly argues that Cuba must be brought 
into the mainstream of scholarship 
and sets out to connect her case 
study to the broader literature on 
development.
Perez-Stable connects the dots of 
history, politics, economics, society 
and international relations that have 
produced the Cuban revolutionary 
landscape since 1959. She brings 
together the interaction of individu­
als, elites, and structures and sheds 
light on the past, present and future
Damian Fernandez is associate professor 
of international relations at Florida 
International University.
of the island’s political system. Only 
through the multiple levels of analy­
sis can one understand the logic of 
the Fidel-Patria-Revolucion equation 
that appealed to the popular classes 
during the early 1960s. That equa­
tion was a product of the support of 
the lower segments of the Cuban 
social system and the inability of eco­
nomic elites to mobilize a counterre­
sponse. Coupled with anti-U.S. sen­
timent on the island and the Cold 
War, the Fidel-Patria-Revolucion com­
bination found an acceptable part­
ner in the Soviet Union.
The Cuban Revolution also connects 
the material factors determ inant in 
Cuba’s development with less tangi­
ble variables like conciencia (i.e. “rev­
olutionary consciousness”). But 
dimensions are not the only ones 
included in the study. The tensions 
within and between institutions and 
organizations, as well as the charis­
matic basis of fidelista leadership, 
also surface as relevant factors which 
explain the course of events. The 
author devotes particular attention 
to labor unions and the Federation 
of Cuban Women.
According to Perez-Stable, the ori­
gins of radical social change are to 
be found in the failure of reformism 
in the decades prior to the 1960s. 
Although this is not necessarily an 
original argument, no one has made 
it as thoroughly. She adds a twist to 
the argum ent by pointing out 
opportunities that reformists and 
the economic elites failed to take.
By shedding light on alternatives 
that never materialized, the book 
underscores the agency and the lim­
its of political protagonists. Con­
trary to many other scholars who 
perceived the Cuban revolution as 
inevitable, Perez-Stable underscores
that history is made m om ent by 
m om ent by the decisions of individ­
uals within the constraints imposed 
by structures. Between the lines the 
au thor’s preference for a different 
outcome shows, although Perez- 
Stable does no t take into account 
the fact that o ther alternatives would 
also have unleashed their own set of 
unexpected and equally unpalatable 
consequences.
The failure of reformist national­
ism polarized society. Particularly 
after the 1940s, the political middle 
ground in Cuba proved, time after 
time, an elusive quest. This legacy 
still haunts the political culture of 
the island and its Diaspora. But if 
the past was not predestined, nei­
ther is the future. Like variations of 
the same object under different 
light, Perez-Stable concludes that 
the interplay between individuals 
and structures can produce a variety 
of outcomes. Perez-Stable dem on­
strates how the same leaders and 
logic that prom oted social change 
eventually closed that space; how a 
legitimate state finds its legitimacy 
slowly eroding. The revolutionary 
unity which initially signalled popu­
lar support for a common front 
against all odds became a useful pre­
text for suppressing dissent and plu­
ralism while sustaining some individ­
uals and institutions in power.
The final connection this book 
makes is that between the past and 
the future of the island. The Fidel- 
Patria-Revolucion is exhausted. As in 
the early years of the revolution, the 
challenge of the 1990s is to compose 
a new form of governance. Whether 
the course will lead to polarization 
and conflict, or toward a mediated 
solution will be decided as actors 
make and miss connections. ■
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P U B L I C A T I 
Latin American Foreign Debt
M arian Goslinga
atin America’s foreign 
debt has been steadily 
on the rise. According 
to the World Bank, the 
region owed US$529 bil­
lion in 1994, a 14 per­
cent increase since 1989, and some 
analysts fear that a new debt crisis 
could be developing. Brazil, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Cuba 
have been classified as “severely 
endebted.” A survey of the litera­
ture reveals that academic interest 
in the subject has waned consider­
ably since the crisis years, but will 
probably intensify when and if the 
situation worsens. According to the 
Hispanic American Periodicals Index 
(better known as HAPI), in 1989, 
there were 89 articles written on the 
Latin American foreign debt. In
1993, this num ber had dwindled to 
15. The following is a list of recent 
publications on the subject, describ­
ing the situation in the various 
countries of the region.
All Eyes on Latin America. Riordan 
Roett. Chief Executive No. 100 
(January/February 1995), p. 23.
America Latina: economia e histori- 
cidad. Norm an Palma. Bogota: 
Indigo Ediciones; 1994. 153 pp. 
[Discusses the debt issue from a 
Colombian standpoint.]
America Latina: el desarrollo en 
tiempos del neoliberalismo. Gustavo
D. Dans. Montevideo: EPPAL; 1994. 
135 pp.
Marian Goslinga is the Latin American 
and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
As Latin Economies Boom, 
Commercial Banks Cautiously 
Re-Enter Loan Market. Paul Kilby.
Latin Finance, no. 63 (December
1994), pp. 49-52. [Describes the 
renewed interest of international 
banks to venture into the area due 
to the success of the Brady debt 
agreements.]
Au Chili, les sirenes de l’oubli et les 
dividendes du liberalisme: sous la 
chape du conformisme. Bernard 
Cassen. Le Monde Diplomatique, v. 42 
(February 1995), pp. 8-9. [Focuses 
on the effects on the economy of 
new policies of democratization and 
the legacy and rem nants of authori­
tarianism.]
Brasil-FMI: frustrates e perspecti- 
vas. Gesner Oliveira. Sao Paulo: 
Bienal; 1993. 192 pp. [Discusses 
relations with the International 
Monetary Fund regarding the debt 
crisis and economic stabilization.]
The Capital Inflows Problem: 
Concepts and Issues. Guillermo A. 
Calvo, Leonardo Leiderman, 
Carmen M. Reinhart. San 
Francisco, CA: ICS Press; 1994.
27 pp. [This occasional paper by 
the International Center for 
Economic Growth compares the 
Latin American situation to that of 
Southeast Asia.]
Capital Markets and Developing 
Country Firms: Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Jack Glen,
Brian Pinto. Finance and 
Development, v. 32, no. 1 (March
1995), pp. 40-44. [Discusses the 
renewed interest in external financ­
ing am ong well established local 
firms.]
The Caribbean in the Global 
Political Economy. H ilbourne A. 
Watson, ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner; 1994. 261 pp. [Analyzes 
restructuring, globalization and 
regional issues affecting the 
Caribbean.]
Central Banking After the Latin 
American Debt Crisis. Arminio 
Fraga. Columbia Journal of World 
Business, v. 29 (Summer 1994), 
p. 66-70. [Discusses the central 
banks of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela 
and their contribution to economic 
stability.]
El clima de los negocios, 1994-1995: 
balance y perspectivas de la 
economia colombiana. Saul Pineda 
Hoyos, Javier B. Cadena Lozano. 
Revista de la Camara de Comercio de 
Bogota (September 1994), pp. 29-37. 
[Describes Colombia’s business cli­
mate and the policy orientations of 
the Gaviria administration.]
Comentarios al documento de crite- 
rios generales de politica economi­
ca, 1994. Arturo H uerta G.
Investigacion Economica, v. 54 
(January-March 1994), pp. 45-70. 
[Assesses economic growth and poli­
cies in Mexico, 1983-1993.]
La crisis y la deuda externa en 
America Latina. Jorge Enrique 
Romero Perez. San Jose, Costa 
Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de 
Costa Rica; 1993. 231 pp. [Com­
pilation of articles by the author 
previously published.]
The Debt Requires More Service.
Walter R. Spurrier. Weekly Analysis, 
v. 24, no. 39 (October 1994), pp.
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401-407. [Examines Ecuador’s pub­
lic sector expenditures and discusses 
the foreign debt service. According 
to the Brady Plan rescheduling 
agreem ent, interest payments will 
increase from 4.0 percent of GDP in
1994 to 4.4 percent of GDP in 1995.]
Debt-for-Nature Swaps and the 
Limits to International Cooperation 
on Behalf o f the Environment.
Janeen Klinger. Environmental 
Politics, v. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 
229-246.
Democracy, Markets, and Structural 
Reform in Latin America: Argen­
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico. William C. Smith, Carlos 
H. Acuna, Eduardo A. Gamarra, 
eds. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers; 1994.
331 pp. [Describes recent econom ­
ic reforms in the region.]
Los desafios de la deuda externa y 
el desarrollo: a diez anos del inicio 
de la crisis. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis.
Estudios Internacionales, v. 26 
(April-June 1993), pp. 155-164. 
[Traces the developm ent of Latin 
America’s foreign debt crisis, 1982- 
1992.]
Did the Debt Crisis or the Oil Price 
Decline Cause Mexico’s Investment 
Collapse? Andrew M. Warner. 
Washington, DC: Economic 
Research Dept., World Bank; 1993.
31 pp.
Economic Reforms in Latin America.
H erm ann Sautter, ed. Frankfurt: 
Vervuert Verlag; 1993. 169 pp. 
[Proceedings of a symposium held 
in November 1992 at the Georg- 
August-Universitat Gottingen.]
En Route to Modern Growth: Latin 
America in the 1990s; Essays in 
Honor of Carlos Diaz-Alejandro.
Gustav Ranis, ed. Washington, DC: 
Johns Hopkins University Press; 
1994. 160 pp. [Study sponsored by 
the Inter-American Development 
Bank.]
Estabilizacion, apertura y pobreza 
en la Republica Dominicana, 1986-
1992. Andres Dauhajre et al. Santo 
Domingo: Ed. Corripio; 1994. 238 
pp. [Analysis of structural adjust­
m ent and trade liberalization poli­
cies in the Dominican Republic.]
El Fondo Monetario Internacional y 
la deuda externa mexicana: crisis y 
estabilizacion. Ricardo Campos. 2a 
ed., revisada. Mexico, DF: Plaza y 
Valdes Editores; 1993. 276 pp. 
[Revised and updated ed. of a work 
on Mexico’s relations with the 
International M onetary Fund; the 
first edition was published in 1991.]
Government Responses to the Latin 
American Debt Problem. Robert E. 
Gross, ed. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers; 1995.
Growth and Inflation in the 
Caribbean, 1977-1992. M. K.
Anyadike-Danes. Bulletin of Eastern 
Caribbean Affairs, v. 19 (June 1994), 
pp. 54-66. [Compares and exam­
ines growth in Barbados to that of 
members of the OECS (Organisa­
tion of Eastern Caribbean States).]
How One Big Battle Was Won: The 
International Debt Crisis o f 1981-82 
and the Mexican 1994 Situation.
William Cline. The Economist, v. 334 
(February 1995), pp. 17-20. [Argues 
that Mexico’s current situation is
much less serious than the 1982 cri­
sis which required a concerted 
international bail-out.]
In Default: Peasants, the Debt 
Crisis, and the Agricultural 
Challenge in Mexico. Marilyn 
Gates. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press; 1993. 274 pp.
Indice bibliografico iberoamericano 
de economia politica, 1981-1992.
Pensamiento iberoamericano (July 
1993/June 1994), pp. 9-666. 
[Bibliography of works relating to 
economic trends and policies in 
Latin America, the Caribbean, and 
Spain.]
Latin America and the Caribbean in 
the 1990s. Arm ando S. Lindo.
Finance and Development, v. 32, no. 1 
(March 1995), pp. 2-4.
Latin America’s Economic Future.
Graham Bird, Ann Helwege, eds. 
San Diego, CA: Academic Press; 
1994. 339 pp. [Examines the dif­
ferent ways in which external debts 
have been reduced in the region 
and lists factors that may endanger 
the recovery.]
Macroeconomic Crises, Policies, 
and Growth in Brazil, 1964-90.
Donald V. Coes. Washington, DC: 
International Economics Dept., 
World Bank; 1994.
Managing International Debt.
William Cline. The Economist, v. 334 
(February 1995), pp. 17-19.
[Focuses on Mexico.]
Mexico After the Debt Crisis: Is 
Growth Sustainable? Daniel Oks, 
Sweder van Wijnbergen.
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Publications Update: Latin A m erican  Foreign Debt
Washington, DC: International 
Economics Dept., World Bank:
1994. 42 pp. [Argues that the 
Brady Plan is primarily responsible 
for the country’s economic expan­
sion.]
Mexico: dependencia y autoritaris-
mo. Pablo Moctezuma Barragan. 
Mexico, DF: <s.n.>; 1994. 162 pp. 
[Links the foreign debt to political 
authoritarianism . ]
Mexique: la degringolade qui a 
ebanie le monde. Patrick Bonazza. 
Point (February 25, 1995), pp. 46- 
51.
1994 versus 1982: deuda externa. 
Alicia Giron Gonzalez. Momento 
Economico (July/August 1994), pp. 
2-6. [Analyzes Mexico’s foreign 
debt problem, 1982-1994.]
Mobile Capital and the Structure of 
Development in Latin America.
James E. Mahon. University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press; 1995.
Money Doctors, Foreign Debts, and 
Economic Reforms in Latin 
America from the 1890s to the 
Present. Paul W. Drake, ed. 
Wilmington, DE: Scholarly 
Resources; 1994. 270 pp. [Focuses 
on international advising and lend­
ing, relations with foreign and 
domestic interest groups, external 
debt failures and the role of the 
International Monetary Fund.]
Moratoria de la deuda en America 
Latina. Oscar Altimir, Robert 
Devlin, eds. Buenos Aires: Fondo 
de Cultura Economica 
de Argentina; 1994. 485 pp. 
[Includes articles on Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador 
and Peru.]
O papel do Senado Federal no cont- 
role do envidamento publico no 
Brasil. Juarez de Souza <et al.>.
Revista de Informafdo Legislativa, v. 31 
(July/Septem ber 1994), pp. 129- 
148. [Discusses certain constitution­
al provisions regarding the role of 
the Senate in controlling and re­
scheduling Brazil’s foreign debt.]
Los pequenos paises de America 
Latina en la hora neoliberal.
Geronimo de Sierra, ed. Mexico, 
DF: Universidad Nacional 
Autonom a de Mexico; 1994. 217 pp. 
[This study, published jointly with 
the Universidad Nacional Heredia 
in Costa Rica, focuses on the 
Central American countries.]
Peru Delays Debt Talks Till ‘95.
LDC Debt Report (December 12, 
1994), pp. 1-10. [This newsletter 
published by American Banker 
alleges that a tentative plan to begin 
negotiating P eru’s external debt has 
been canceled. Peru is insisting 
that lawsuits against the country be 
dropped as a precondition for nego­
tiating.]
Peru: Back From the Brink. Maria
E. Lasagabaster. IDB [International 
Development Bank], v. 21, no. 8 
(August 1994), pp. 4-5. [Describes 
the rewards of economic reforms in 
Peru. In 1993, the country became 
one of Latin America’s top econ­
omies with 6.5 percent GDP growth.]
La politica de la deuda externa.
Jose Angel Gurria. Mexico, DF: 
Fondo de Cultura Economica; 1993. 
274 pp. [Analyzes the Mexican for­
eign debt problem, its rescheduling 
process, and other economic poli­
cies of the Salinas administration.]
The Politics o f Economic 
Liberalization: Argentina and Brazil 
in Comparative Perspective. Robert 
A. P. ckingham. Notre Dame, IN: 
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